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With the proliferation of asymmetrical threats and the advancement of conventional 
threats to armored ground vehicles, the traditional method of improving protection and 
survivability of armored vehicles by adding metal has dramatically decreased in its 
effectiveness. In addition, the global trend of conflicts and battles taking place in the 
urban environment in inevitable. It is envisioned by many military thinkers and scholars 
that the majority of future conflicts will take place in an urban setting. Furthermore, the 
expanded mission sets that are required of armored forces dictate the requirement of a 
force with high survivability in order to perform the myriad of tasks required. 
Hence, this study addresses the allocation of resources to improve survivability, 
via a combination of conventional and asymmetric means, of armored vehicles in an 
offensive operation in an urban environment, and it is done in the context of an Armored 
Company Team. 
The study has taken the following approach and methodology: 
(1) Systems Engineering Approach 
A systems engineering approach has been applied initially to define the 
boundaries of the problems and to identify the respective stakeholders. The operational 
and functional architectures required by an Armored Company Team are also defined. 
This allows the identification of four important Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), 
namely Percentage of BLUE Casualties, Force Exchange Ratio, Probability of 
Completing Mission, and Time Steps taken to Complete Mission. 
(2) Analysis Methodology 
Agent-based simulation is the analysis tool used in the study. The simulation 
software of choice is Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) software developed 
by the New Zealand Defense Force. A robust design of experiments is then conducted for 
both the initial and refined simulation runs to generate sets of comprehensive design 
points for the study. 
 xx 
(3) Combat Operations and Scenario 
The various mission sets required for the conduct of Offensive Operations by an 
Armored Company Team, along with the characteristics of the urban environment, are 
established. A review of the present capabilities and makeup of both the BLUE forces 
and the associated threats are conducted. These, along with a description of the scenario 
and a truncated version of the typical operational orders, provide reference for the study 
and simulation. 
(4) Factor Selection 
The factors that are identified for variation and study in the simulation include: 
Armor Thickness Percentage, Presence of Active Protection System, Presence of 
Explosive Reactive Armor, Mobility Percentage, Presence of Signature Management 
Measures, Presence of Additional Sensor and Force Structure. 
(5) Results Analysis 
The results of the simulations are analyzed using the statistical software, JMP Pro 
10. It was revealed that only the following factors were significant to the four MOEs: 
Armor Thickness Percentage, Presence of Active Protection System, Presence of 
Explosive Reactive Armor, Mobility Percentage, and Force Structure.  
Further analysis on these factors was done and it yielded a set of equations that 
allows the prediction of the outcome of the four MOEs. A partition tree was also obtained 
for each MOE where the relative importance and threshold values of the factors were 
identified. 
(6) Conclusion and Recommendations 
The findings of this study would enable the military commanders and planners to 
have an indication, based on the four MOEs, of the outcome of their conduct of offensive 
operations in an urban environment using an Armored Company Team. In addition, the 
identification of the important factors sets the direction for the investment of resources to 
upgrade current armored vehicles or in the design of the next generation of armored 
vehicles in order to improve their survivability. 
 xxi 
Future research should address the following areas. 
 Setting the scenario in a different environment and type of operation. 
 Using a more robust design of experiments and using other simulation 
software, such as COMBAT XXI, to further expand and validate the 
current findings. 
 Using the actual values for the attributes of the armored vehicles in 
simulation as the current values are derived from open sources and may 
deviate from the actual classified values. 
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War has been present throughout the history of mankind. As mankind engages in 
conflict, the idea of protecting oneself remains central in mankind’s evolution and 
progress. In the early ages, armor started out as merely thick hides or leather that was 
draped over the body for protection. As human kind evolved, the armor employed 
became progressively more effective and sophisticated. 
Armor such as chain mail and iron plates left their mark in history as the cutting 
edge protection system of their time. As technology advanced, the need for protection 
gradually extended from the infantry soldiers and animals, such as war horses, to vehicles 
and equipment. The thundering of the British-made Mark 1 tanks across the infantry 
trenches during the Battle of the Somme on 15 September 1916 heralded in the age of 
armored warfare (Yap 2012). 
Since then, having seen the value and decisiveness of armored vehicles and tanks 
on the battlefield, the preoccupation of the armies of the world has been to improve the 
lethality of the armored vehicles in their military inventory, as well as to improve the 
armor protection of the vehicles. This technological race has especially been evident 
during and after major modern conflicts like the Second World War, the Yom Kippur 
War of 1973, Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. 
However, the improvement of armor protection by adding on more metal as 
passive armor is unlikely to keep pace with the development of the anti-armor weapons. 
Hence, asymmetrical ways of improving armor protection must be sought to improve 
survivability of the armored vehicles in a combat environment. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
With the rapid advancement of anti-armor weapon penetration capability, the 
traditional approach to mitigate the threat by simply adding more armor on tanks and 
armored vehicles has become progressively ineffective as it approaches the physical 
2 
 
limitation of the sheer amount of armor that can be mounted on a vehicle for it to 
navigate terrain and fight effectively in its area of operations. 
In addition, with the current capability of the armor to withstand the penetration 
threat, is there a further need to bolster its armor protection to improve its combat 
survivability? Conversely, would it be more worthwhile to invest resources in 
asymmetric protection such as sensor capabilities to better detect and hence actively 
engage or avoid the threat to improve survivability? 
This thesis aims to determine the allocation of resources among the procurement 
of more armor protection for the ground systems (to better defeat the threat or survive a 
hit), improvement of the ground platforms’ mobility as a form of passive defense, and the 
procurement of more sensor capabilities to detect the threat earlier (to better defeat the 
threat or evade it). The context of the research will be focused on an offensive operation 
in a hypothetical combat environment and involves three classes of ground platforms, 
namely main battle tank, armored fighting vehicle (tracked), and infantry carrying vehicle 
(wheeled). 
Specifically, this thesis will focus on the operations of an Armored Company 
Team, which is comprised of a company of nine to 12 armored vehicles, based on its 
force structure of a mixture main battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, or infantry 
carrying vehicles. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions guided the direction of the research for this study. 
1. What are the primary design factors for a ground combat vehicle in order 
to achieve mission success and survivability in offensive operations in an 
urban environment? 
2. How does the tradeoff of one parameter affect the platform’s 
survivability and performance as a whole?  
3. What is the relative importance of attributes on the platform? 
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D. SURVIVABILITY CONCEPT 
The concept of combat survivability is often encapsulated in the form of a 
Survivability Onion (Kempinski and Murphy 2012) which serves to illustrate and 
enhance the survivability design of a combat system based on several “onion-like” layers, 
with the innermost layer being the most important. Figure 1. is an illustration of the 
survivability onion concept. 
 
Figure 1.  Survivability Onion concept (from Kempinski and Murphy 2012). 
(1) Destroy Enemy beyond their Engagement Range 
This is the outermost layer of the Survivability Onion and it addresses the concept 
of engaging and destroying the enemy before the enemy can engage the friendly forces, 
thereby preventing the friendly forces from being engaged and destroyed by the enemy. 
The force of choice normally consists of long range strike capability such as air power 




(2) Avoid Being Detected 
This layer of the onion deals with two factors, signature reduction and enhancing 
situation awareness. Signature reduction refers to reducing the “tell-tale” signs of the 
presence of an armored vehicle, such as the vehicle’s infrared emissions, while enhancing 
situation awareness for the armored vehicle allows it to sense and detect the presence of 
enemy more effectively and take evasive measures to avoid it if necessary. These two 
factors enhance the system’s survivability by reducing the probability of the armored 
vehicle being detected by enemy forces. 
(3) Avoid Being Engaged 
This layer addresses the likelihood of a system being targeted and tracked by an 
adversary. It involves using terrain and obstacles, along with tactical maneuvers, to 
prevent being engaged or fired upon by the enemy. 
(4) Avoid Being Hit 
This layer addresses the probability of the system being hit after being seen and 
acquired by the enemy. It utilizes the Soft Kill, which includes measures such as 
electronic spoofing that prevents the incoming threat from remaining locked onto the 
armored vehicle and thereby failing to hit it. It also utilizes the Hard Kill, which includes 
measures that actively detect and destroy the incoming threat by firing projectiles to 
intercept the threat (Kempinski and Murphy 2012). Both types of measures enhance its 
survivability. 
(5) Prevent Penetration 
This layer deals with the likelihood of a system being penetrated by a projectile 
after it is hit. It depends on its active protection and base layer of passive armor for 
system survival. 
(6) Minimize Damage 
This is the innermost layer of the onion and it addresses the probability of a 
system being killed or destroyed after being penetrated. All its defenses and protection 
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suites have already been rendered ineffective and it depends on system design to limit the 
damage sustained and improve survivability (Treml 2013). 
E. VULNERABILITY CONCEPT 
Vulnerability is the inability of the system to withstand damage in a hostile 
environment. It is the liability to sustain serious damage that results in a mission kill or 
destruction when hit by enemy fire (Treml 2013). 
Vulnerability is largely influenced by the following factors: 
1. Size, number, and type of projectiles that impact the system 
2. System design 
F. SUSCEPTIBILITY CONCEPT 
Susceptibility is defined as the inability of the system to avoid being damaged by 
mechanisms generated by a hostile environment. Susceptibility of a system is influenced 
by the following factors (Treml 2013): 
1. Threat characteristics, operations, and effectiveness 
2. System’s signature, countermeasures, and protection suites 
3. The encounter scenario between the system and the threat 
G. WHY THE URBAN OPERATIONS SCENARIO? 
There is no doubt that our world is being urbanized more comprehensively than 
ever before, with the urban population being expected to reach 6.3 billion in the year 
2050 (United Nations 2012). As illustrated in Figure 2. the percentage of world 
population that resides in an urban environment has increased from 29.4% in 1950 to a 
projected value of 67.2% in 2050.  
An increasing number of people are being crammed into cities and urban 
environments with ill-equipped infrastructure to handle such an influx of people. Hence, 
competition for resources and security will ensue. Under these stresses and conditions, 
the simmering ethnic and economic tension can explode and precipitate into a flashpoint 




Figure 2.  Global urbanization trend (from United Nations 2012). 
It is no coincidence that urban terrains are the battlefield of choice by militaries 
that are less technologically advanced. The network of roads and houses serves to negate 
the military advantages of the technologically advanced forces as it denies these forces 
the freedom to use their weaponry to engage and destroy targets efficiently and 
effectively (Graham 2009). 
As this global trend suggests, there is no doubt that the future of military combat 
and warfare lies in the urban environment, where it is dominated by streets, buildings, 
and houses. The importance of urban military operations is highlighted in the “Three 
Blocks War” theory (Krulak 1999). Thus, it is unavoidable that military combat 
operations in urban environments are of great concern to the defense community and 





II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
The research on the identified problem is framed using a systems engineering 
approach, whereby the boundaries of the problem and the key stakeholders are identified. 
The architecture of the Armored Company Team was analyzed and the important 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) were determined (SE Handbook Working Group 
2010). 
A.  BOUNDARIES AND INTERACTIONS 
The Armored Company Team is expected to interact with numerous external 
systems that exist within its area of operations. The external systems are namely the 
Command Element of the Armored Company Team, Enemy Platforms, Intelligence 
Elements, Friendly Forces, and the Environment. The Operational View-2 (Operational 
Resource Flow Description) for the boundaries and interaction of the Armored Company 




Figure 3.  Operational View-2 for the Armored Company Team
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(1) Command Element 
The Command Element is expected to interact with the Armored Company Team 
via a Command Link where orders and commands can be issued to the tactical units from 
higher echelons. In addition, an Information Link exists between the Command Element, 
which is the higher echelon, and the Armored Company Team where information 
regarding the battle can be actively conveyed and shared via Situation Reports 
(SITREPs). 
(2) Enemy Platforms 
The interaction between the Armored Company Team and the Enemy units is via 
a Physical Link where they attempt to engage and destroy each other using physical 
projectiles and weaponry. 
(3) Intelligence Elements 
The Armored Company Team interacts with the Intelligence Elements via an 
information link where the intelligence data regarding the battle and mission are 
exchanged. 
(4) Friendly Forces 
The Armored Company Team interacts with the other friendly tactical units via a 
Physical link (where the transfer of materials such as food, water, ammunition, and 
equipment occurs) and a Battlefield Information Link where the data and information 
regarding the battle is exchanged. 
(5) Environment 
The system can sense and measure from the environment information such as the 
temperature, air viscosity, and wind speed to the Armored Company Team for processing 





B.  STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
The stakeholders that are involved in the Armored Company Team are the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Army, and the crew for the Armored Company 
Team, and the industry that will design and build the system. The various needs, goals, 
and objectives of the stakeholders are listed in Table 1.   
Table 1.   Stakeholders analysis of the Armored Company Team 
  
The prioritization of the stakeholders was carried out using an Interest and 
Influence matrix as part of the stakeholders’ analysis as illustrated in Error! Reference 
source not found.The stakeholders were categorized into four groups—Engage Actively, 
Keep Satisfied, Keep Informed, and Monitor—based on their respective influence over 
the system as well as their interest in the system.   
S/N STAKEHOLDERS TYPE NEEDS GOALS OBJECTIVES
1
US Department of 
Defense (DoD)
Sponsor
To have the capability to win any 
ground military operations.
To successfully win any 
ground military operations.





To support the US DoD.
To win the ground military 
operations.







To have a superior armor platform 
against the enemy's platform.
To accomplish mission.
To destroy enemy forces and 
survive the engagement.
4 Industry Developer
To earn and generate profit to sustain 
the industry.
To become the 
manufacturer of the 
Armored Company Team.
To design and built the 
Armored Company Team at 
an economical and effective 
manner.
5 Enemy Adversary
To maintain at least tactical parity with 
that of the BLUE forces' ground forces.
To defeat or prevent defeat 
by the BLUE forces in any 
military operations.
To have a ground platform of 
at least tactical parity with 





Figure 4.  Interest and influence matrix of the Armored Company Team 
stakeholders. 
The stakeholders were arranged in descending order of priority as follows: 
(1) Engage Actively 
The U.S. DOD and U.S. Army are classified under the category of “Engage 
Actively” as they are the important stakeholders of the Armored Company Team. The 
U.S. DOD, with its responsibility of defending the nation with military might, has the 
overall authority and interest in the Armored Company as it needs a tactically superior 
ground platform to win any ground military operations. Hence, it has the most interest 
and influence over the design of an Armored Company Team. 
The U.S. Army is a subset of the U.S. DOD. It fulfills the commands and needs of 
the U.S. DOD by having the capability of winning ground military operations. Likewise, 
in order to do so, it requires tactically superior ground platforms. Thus, it has as much 
interest as the U.S. DOD but lesser influence due to its lower hierarchy. 
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(2) Keep Satisfied 
The military industry that produces and designs the Armored Company Team has 
an interest in the design of the Armored Company Team. As a private contractor and 
manufacturer, it has substantial influence on the Armored Company Team, and hence, it 
is being classified under the “Keep Satisfied” category. 
(3) Keep Informed 
The Armored Company Team crew members have a lot of interest in having a 
tactically superior ground platform as they live and die with the platform they operate in 
during a military operation. It is in their interest to have a tactically superior platform to 
enhance their chances of victory and survival. However, being the end user, they have 
less influence, as compared to the DOD and U.S. Army, over the design of the Armored 
Company Team and hence are classified into the “Keep Informed” category. 
(4) Monitor 
The enemy will always try its best to outperform the BLUE forces. The enemy 
will always strive to have the tactical edge over the BLUE forces. However, it does not 
have direct influence over the Armored Company Team. At the same time, it is also 
necessary to keep track of the technological advancement of the enemy’s arsenal. Hence, 
the enemy is being classified into the “Monitor” category. 
C. ARCHITECTURE 
The architecture of the Armored Company Team was analyzed as part of the 
effort to have a deeper understanding of the composition and functions required of the 
Armored Company Team. 
(1) Capabilities Need 
The sole capability need of the Armored Company Team is the need for the U.S. 




The overarching capability of the Armored Company Team is to enable 
domination and to triumph in the ground military campaign. To do this, the Armored 
Company Team must provide a tactical advantage for the U.S. military forces while 
engaging the enemy through the conduct of various ground military operations in 
accordance with the Armored Brigade Combat Team Mission Essential Task List (U.S. 
Army 2012), namely: 
1. Conduct Offensive Operations 
2. Conduct Defensive Operations 
3. Conduct Security Operations 
4. Conduct Area Security 
5. Conduct Stability Operations 
6. Provide Fire Support 
7. Conduct Civil Support Operations 
The focus of this study will be solely on the Conduct Offensive Operations. The 




Figure 5.  Capabilities of Armored Company Team. 
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1. Operational Architecture 
The operational architecture allows the Armored Company Team to fulfill and 
accomplish its mission of conducting Offensive Operations. In order to fulfill the conduct 
of Offensive Operations, the Armored Company Team must be able to perform the 
Operational Activities illustrated in Figure 6. In compliance with DOD Architecture 
Framework definition of architecture, the Operational Architecture is illustrated in the 
form of an Operational Activity Decomposition Tree, also labeled as the Operational 










2. Functional Architecture 
In order to fulfill its function of “Performing Offensive Operations,” the Armored 
Company Team has to carry out various functions that are aggregated in the following 
manner: To Maneuver, To Communicate, To Sense, To Take Action, and To Perform 
Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA). The entire suite of the Armored Company Team 
functions is decomposed in the following manner, as illustrated in Figure 7.  
Functional architecture supports the operational architecture. The functions serve 
to fulfill the operational activities that are required of the Armored Company Team to 
accomplish its mission. It is also constructed with the perspective of the survivability of 
the Armored Company Team in the conduct of offensive operations. The mapping of the 
functions to the respective operational activities under the operational architecture of the 








Figure 8.  Mapping of functions of the Armored Company Team to respective Operational Activities – Part 1. 
 





















F To Perform Offensive Operations P
F.1 To Maneuver P
F.1.1 Provide Speed Control P P
F.1.2 Provide Directional Control P P
F.1.3 Provide Navigation Ability P P P
F.2 To Communicate P P
F.2.1 Communicate within Own Platform P P P P P P
F.2.2 Communicate with Other Units P P P
F.3 To Sense P
F.3.1 Detect and Identify Enemy P P
F.3.2 Detect and Identify Friendly Forces P P
F.3.3 Detect and Identify Non-Combatants P P
F.3.4 Sense Environnmental Information P
F.4 To Take Action P
F.4.1 Engage Enemy Lethally P P
F.4.1.1 Calculate Fire Control Solution
F.4.1.2 Fire Primary Weapon
F.4.1.3 Fire Secondary Weapons
F.4.2 Take Non Lethal Actions
F.4.2.1 Activate Protective Capabilities
F.4.2.2 Perform Evasive Maneuvers
F.5 To Perform BDA P
F.5.1 Assess No. of Enemy Casualties
F.5.2 Assess No. of Friendly Casualties




Figure 9.  Mapping of functions of the Armored Company Team to respective Operational Activities – Part 2. 
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F To Perform Offensive Operations
F.1 To Maneuver
F.1.1 Provide Speed Control P
F.1.2 Provide Directional Control P
F.1.3 Provide Navigation Ability
F.2 To Communicate
F.2.1 Communicate within Own Platform P P P P P P P P P
F.2.2 Communicate with Other Units
F.3 To Sense
F.3.1 Detect and Identify Enemy P
F.3.2 Detect and Identify Friendly Forces
F.3.3 Detect and Identify Non-Combatants
F.3.4 Sense Environnmental Information P
F.4 To Take Action
F.4.1 Engage Enemy Lethally P P P P P P P
F.4.1.1 Calculate Fire Control Solution P P P
F.4.1.2 Fire Primary Weapon P P P P
F.4.1.3 Fire Secondary Weapons P P P P
F.4.2 Take Non Lethal Actions P P P P
F.4.2.1 Activate Protective Capabilities P
F.4.2.2 Perform Evasive Maneuvers P P
F.5 To Perform BDA
F.5.1 Assess No. of Enemy Casualties
F.5.2 Assess No. of Friendly Casualties




Figure 10.  Mapping of functions of the Armored Company Team to respective Operational Activities – Part 3. 
OA.0.5 OA.0.5.1 OA.0.5.2 OA.0.5.3
Perform BDA
Assess No. of Enemy 
Destroyed / Damaged
Assess No. of Own 
Forces Destroyed / 
Damaged
Assess Status of 
Own Platform
F To Perform Offensive Operations
F.1 To Maneuver
F.1.1 Provide Speed Control
F.1.2 Provide Directional Control
F.1.3 Provide Navigation Ability
F.2 To Communicate
F.2.1 Communicate within Own Platform
F.2.2 Communicate with Other Units
F.3 To Sense
F.3.1 Detect and Identify Enemy P
F.3.2 Detect and Identify Friendly Forces P
F.3.3 Detect and Identify Non-Combatants
F.3.4 Sense Environnmental Information
F.4 To Take Action
F.4.1 Engage Enemy Lethally
F.4.1.1 Calculate Fire Control Solution
F.4.1.2 Fire Primary Weapon
F.4.1.3 Fire Secondary Weapons
F.4.2 Take Non Lethal Actions
F.4.2.1 Activate Protective Capabilities
F.4.2.2 Perform Evasive Maneuvers
F.5 To Perform BDA
F.5.1 Assess No. of Enemy Casualties P P
F.5.2 Assess No. of Friendly Casualties P P
F.5.3 Assess Own Platform Status P P
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D.  MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
MOEs are defined as the “operational” measures of success that are closely 
related to the achievement of the mission, or the operational objective being evaluated, in 
the intended operational environment under specified sets of conditions (i.e., how well 
the solution achieves the intended purpose) (SE Handbook Working Group 2010). 
For the purpose of this research, the following four MOEs that are important and 
relevant to any military commanders and planners were studied. The importance and 
justification of the selection of the individual MOEs are elaborated in the following 
section while Figure 11. illustrates the operational activities from the operational 





Figure 11.  Mapping of Operational Activities to respective MOEs.







Time Steps taken to 
Complete Mission
OA.0 Offensive Operations
OA.0.1 Maneuver P P
OA.0.1.1 Accelerate / Decelerate P P P
OA.0.1.2 Change Direction P P P
OA.0.2 Communicate P P
OA.0.2.1 Issue Orders P P
OA.0.2.2 Send SITREP P P P P
OA.0.3 Detect P P P P
OA.0.3.1 Identify Enemy P P P P
OA.0.3.2 Identify Friendly Forces P P P
OA.0.3.3 Identify Non-Combatants P
OA.0.4 Take Actions P
OA.0.4.1 Engage Enemy P P P
OA.0.4.1.1 Calculate Fire Control Solution P P P
OA.0.4.1.2 Fire Primary Weapon P P P
OA.0.4.1.3 Fire Secondary Weapon P P P
OA.0.4.1.4 Elevate / Depress Weapon P P P
OA.0.4.1.5 Traverse Turret to Track / Engage Targets P P P
OA.0.4.2 Take Protective Actions P P P
OA.0.4.2.1 Obscure Enemy Detection P P P
OA.0.4.2.2 Evasive Maneuvers P P P
OA.0.4.2.3 Activate Protective Capabilities P P P P
OA.0.5 Perform BDA P
OA.0.5.1 Assess No. of Enemy Destroyed / Damaged P
OA.0.5.2 Assess No. of Own Forces Destroyed / Damaged P P




1. Percentage BLUE Casualties 
This MOE is important and chosen as the number of casualties sustained is one of 
the primary concerns of a military commander in a combat operation. The number of 
casualties incurred directly impacts and affects the amount of combat power that a 
military commander has to bring to bear on the enemy. In addition, on a more strategic 
level, the number of casualties sustained has a significant impact on the citizens’ positive 
support of the war effort (Larson 1996).  
This MOE is attained by calculating the ratio of the total number of BLUE 
casualties sustained in the mission over the initial total number of BLUE units that took 
part in the mission. 
Percentage BLUE Casualties = (Number of Blue Casualties/Total Number 
of BLUE Units) ×100%  (1) 
This MOE is actually a subset of MOE #2, Force Exchange Ratio. The MOE that 
addresses Percentage of BLUE Casualties is included as it will provide a quick and 
unambiguous measurement and indication in the number of casualties that an operation is 
likely to incur for the BLUE forces. This insight will prove invaluable to military 
commanders and planners when deciding the size force required. 
2. Force Exchange Ratio (FER) 
This metric is important as it provides an indication of the effectiveness and 
lethality of own forces’ capability against that of the adversary. In addition, a positive 
outcome of this MOE (high FER) would aid in reducing the negative impact of the 
number of casualties sustained by the BLUE forces (Boettcher III and Cobb 2006) and, 
hence, would aid in garnering positive public perception and support for the combat 
operations. 
This MOE measures the effectiveness of the Armored Company Team in its 
ability to inflict casualties on the enemy and protecting itself at the same time. It is 




 FER = % Red Casualties / % BLUE Casualties (2) 
3. Probability of Completing Mission 
The ability to have an indication of the outcome of a combat operation is 
beneficial. As combat and conflicts are risky and costly affairs, having an indication of 
the likelihood of success would enable the military commander to make the tough 
decision of whether to partake in or refrain from fighting (P. L. Sullivan 2008). In 
addition, it allows the military commander to determine the amount of resources required 
for the success of the operation. 
This MOE provides an indication of the likelihood of the Armored Company 
Team accomplishing its given mission, hence achieving Mission Success. The conditions 
required for Mission Success are defined in Chapter V. It is derived by taking the ratio of 
the number of simulation runs whereby the mission is accomplished over the total 
number of simulation runs conducted for each individual set of parameters. 
Probability of Completing Mission = Number of Runs with Mission 
Success / Total Number of Simulation Runs per set of parameters (3) 
4. Time Steps Taken to Complete Mission 
This metric is important as it provides an indication of the expected length of the 
conflict. In turn, it allows the military commanders and planners to plan and allocate 
human and materiel resources that are required to sustain the operation until success is 
achieved. In addition, increasing the length of the conflict will increase the likelihood of 
public resentment of the combat operations (L. P. Sullivan 2008). Hence, on a more 
strategic level, this metric provides the military commanders and planners with a tool to 
manage and measure public support for the combat operations. 
This MOE provides a brief insight into the length of time required by the 
Armored Company Team to accomplish its mission. It is derived from the direct 
measurement of the number of time steps taken to accomplish the mission in the 
simulation model, where each time step is representative of 25 milliseconds in real time. 
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III. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The systems analysis methodology used for creating the simulation scenario and 
the analysis of the data for this study are explained in this section. The process begins 
with the determination of the type of simulations required, followed by choosing the 
modeling software to create the scenario and farm data. The set of design parameters 
were determined by means of a design of experiment (DOE) created by statistical 
software. The results from the simulation were processed and analyzed with statistical 
software as well. 
A. TYPES OF MODELS AND SIMULATIONS 
A model is defined as a physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical 
representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process. Simulation is defined as a 
method of implementing a model over time (Coolahan 2003). 
The DOD often categorizes models and simulations into four different levels: 
Engineering, Engagement, Mission and Campaign. The hierarchy of the different types of 
models is illustrated in the Modeling and Simulation Pyramid in Figure 12.  
 




As the hierarchy increases, the factors of the models, such as time and effects, 
become more pronounced and accurate at the expense of the detail and fidelity of the 
model. The different models are typically used by the DOD in the following manner 
(Coolahan 2003): 
(1) Campaign Model 
Analysts and experimenters in the DOD typically use the Campaign Model for 
warfare analysis at a strategic force level. 
(2) Mission Model 
The Mission Model is used in a similar fashion except in a lower tactical level 
type of scenario to simulate and model smaller engagements. 
(3) Engagement Model 
The Engagement Model is used mostly in weapons projects that are being carried 
out in the DOD. 
(4) Engineering Model 
Engineering Model is an equation or curve fit based on empirical data that is used 
to study background phenomenology on military systems by the DOD. 
This study gravitated toward the interactions and effects of tactical armor units 
and enemy forces in a ground mission which is more of a tactical nature. Hence, a 
“Mission” type of model was deemed to be suitable for use. 
B. MAP AWARE NON-UNIFROM AUTOMATA (MANA) 
MANA was developed by the Defense Technology Agency of the New Zealand 
Defense Force. MANA is an agent-based, time-stepped, stochastic, map aware modeling 
tool. The advantages and disadvantages of the modeling software are discussed in the 
following sections and summarized in Table 2.  The following discussion on MANA was 
referenced from a recent capstone project report on the Distributed Surface Force by the 
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SEA 20 project team, where the author of this thesis was a co-author (SEA Cohort 20 
2014). 
Table 2.   Summary of advantages and disadvantages of MANA. 
ADVANTAGES OF MANA DISADVANTAGES OF MANA 
1. Map awareness 
2. In-built degree of 
randomness in agents 
3. Realistic representation of 
environment 
4. Non-uniform properties of 
agents 
5. Areas of interest can be 
realistically constructed 
and modeled  
6. Intuitive user interface 
1. Targeting is limited to 
agent vs. agent 
2. General lack of command 
and control ability 
3. Inadequate in modeling 
physics of projectiles 
4. Little fidelity in modeling 
fluctuating environment 
conditions 
5. Does not distinguish point 
of impact of projectile on 
agents 
 
1. Advantages of MANA 
MANA exhibits map awareness, allowing agents in the model to move and react 
according to specific preset decision processes. Similar to modeling tools where specific 
waypoint guidance directs individual agents from point to point, MANA has the added 
benefit of being able to alter the movement of individual squads according to the 
environment. Real life friction of units in the battle space is simulated through the use of 
varying levels of randomness in the movement of each unit through its predetermined 
path space (SEA Cohort 20 2014). This is advantageous as it adds realism to the 
outcome.  
In addition, the designer is able to add realistic landmasses and shallow waters 
that inhibit travel into the scenario as MANA allows for units to be programmed such 
that they can only travel over specific environments. Limits can also be set on the 
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maximum and minimum distances to between units. This enables the designer to evaluate 
the concept of operations, as well as standard operating procedures that may be employed 
in the design of the armored vehicles of the future. 
Another interesting feature of MANA is the non-uniform aspect of the model. The 
model allows for each individual unit or squad to be programmed with unique 
characteristics and limitations. This enables the capabilities and specific features of each 
unit to be tailored, independently of the group, which is later found to be invaluable in the 
design of experiments.   
Each unit in MANA behaves as a separate and individual complex entity. This 
means that while each unit will operate according to a specific set of loosely defined 
guidelines, slight differences in the environment or conditions of two identical units can 
result in drastically different behavioral actions. Again, this accounts for some friction in 
the battle space, as well as provides a realistic behavioral outcome for individual units in 
combat.   
Another advantage of using MANA is its ease of use. The user interface is fairly 
intuitive and does not require advance programming knowledge. Significant resources are 
available to aid the user in overcoming specific knowledge gaps. Accurate and realistic 
threat regions can be constructed with relative ease. For example, overlaying global 
satellite data images allows for terrain manipulation to reflect these images to be 
completed quickly and intuitively. This is particularly important if the user intends on 
evaluating specific forces in multiple threat regions.  
Finally, the model is time-stepped, making it faster to run multiple scenarios in a 
given time frame. 
2. Disadvantages of MANA 
There are some disadvantages to using MANA and a major limitation is agent vs. 
agent targeting. Offensive units are required to target specific enemy units in order to 
engage, rather than shooting in the general direction of an incoming group of targets. 
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Technology advancements have made this a rather significant limitation as advanced 
weapons systems under consideration utilize individual targeting technologies.   
The other major disadvantage to this simulation program is the general lack of a 
command and control capability. There are no headquarters or command element to 
control or issue orders to sub-units in the MANA simulation software.  
In addition, MANA is inadequate in modeling incoming projectiles. The physics 
of projectiles, such as trajectory, flight time, etc., are not displayed during engagements. 
For example, a missile fired by the RED agent hits a BLUE agent instantaneously when 
conditions are met, without the possibility of interception even if the BLUE agent 
possesses the capability in actuality. Furthermore, the MANA model has little fidelity in 
terms of the fluctuating environmental conditions in the operation scenarios. Effects of 
variation in environmental factors, such as humidity and lighting on mobility and 
efficiency of the armored vehicles’ behaviors cannot be modeled directly and accurately 
during simulation. In order to mimic environmental influences, proxies such as reduction 
in speed and weapon hit probabilities have to be used instead, which consequently 
decreases model fidelity. 
Finally, the algorithms in MANA do not discern the location or compartment that 
is hit when a projectile strikes an agent. This removes the ability to simulate hits on 
critical components on agents resulting in either catastrophic kills or mission kills.  
Hence, after deliberation over the advantages and disadvantages of the MANA 
modeling software, it was decided that MANA is suitable to be used as the modeling 
software for this study. 
C. FACTORS SELECTION 
In order to have a holistic investigation and research into the problem, seven 
factors that will affect the survivability of an Armored force in urban environment are 
selected, namely Armor Thickness Percentage, Presence of Active Protection System 
(APS), Presence of Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA), Mobility Percentage, Signature 
Management Measures, Presence of Additional Sensor (UAV), and Force Structure.  
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The selection of the factors aims to address key components of the survivability 
concept, susceptibility and vulnerability, with respect to the ground armored vehicles. 
The portion of the survivability concept addressed by each factor is listed. The tracing of 
the factors to the functional architecture of the Armored Company Team is provided in 
Error! Reference source not found.  
1. Armor Thickness Percentage – Vulnerability 
2. Presence of Active Protection System – Susceptibility 
3. Presence of Explosive Reactive Armor – Vulnerability 
4. Mobility Percentage – Susceptibility 
5. Signature Management Measures – Susceptibility 
6. Presence of Additional Sensor  – Susceptibility 




Figure 13.  Tracing of Design Factors to Functional Architecture of the Armored Company Team.
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F To Perform Offensive Operations
F.1 To Maneuver P
F.1.1 Provide Speed Control P
F.1.2 Provide Directional Control P
F.1.3 Provide Navigation Ability P
F.2 To Communicate P
F.2.1 Communicate within Own Platform P
F.2.2 Communicate with Other Units P
F.3 To Sense P
F.3.1 Detect and Identify Enemy P
F.3.2 Detect and Identify Friendly Forces P
F.3.3 Detect and Identify Non-Combatants P
F.3.4 Sense Environnmental Information P
F.4 To Take Action P
F.4.1 Engage Enemy Lethally P
F.4.1.1 Calculate Fire Control Solution P P
F.4.1.2 Fire Primary Weapon P
F.4.1.3 Fire Secondary Weapons P
F.4.2 Take Non Lethal Actions P P P P
F.4.2.1 Activate Protective Capabilities P P P P P
F.4.2.2 Perform Evasive Maneuvers P P
F.5 To Perform BDA P
F.5.1 Assess No. of Enemy Casualties P
F.5.2 Assess No. of Friendly Casualties P




A summary of the factors and their scope of variations in the simulation, along 
with the intended effects and the affected portion of survivability concept, are illustrated 
in Error! Reference source not found. 




1. Passive Armor Thickness Percentage 
The most obvious method to improve the protection of an armored vehicle would 
be to further pile on more armor to increase the thickness of the armor between the 
hostile projectile and the occupants and critical components inside the vehicle. The rapid 




Figure 14.  Increase of Armor Thickness on Vehicles since the Conception of 
Armored Warfare (from Yap 2012). 
However, while this may appear to be the obvious method, there is an inflexion 
point and limitation to the amount of armor that can be mounted on a vehicle due to 
weight and space constraints on the vehicle. On the other hand, while it is not 
investigated and based on the author’s experience, it would be unwise to reduce the 
current level of passive armor mounted on armored vehicles. Hence, it is in the interest of 
this research to vary the armor thickness percentage of the vehicles from the present day 
value of 100% to a maximum of 140%, which is taken as the physical limit on the 
amount of armor that can be installed on a vehicle. This is referenced from the author’s 
experience as an armored vehicle operator and background in the defense industry. 
2. Presence of Active Protection System (APS) 
Active Protection System has been employed as a solution to improve the 
protection of armor vehicles without piling on additional weight in the form of passive 
armor. It is designed to prevent the incoming hostile projectiles from hitting the vehicle it 
is intended to protect, as discussed in previous chapters. Active Protection Systems, such 
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as the Trophy, have proved to be effective in improving vehicle protection as evidenced 
in the recent Israel – Palestinian conflict (Rogoway 2014) and an illustration of the 
Trophy system intercepting a projectile is provided in Error! Reference source not 
found. 
 
Figure 15.  Trophy APS Intercepting an Incoming Hostile Projectile (from Armada 
2013). 
Although the effectiveness of the Trophy APS is proven, the Israel Defense Force 
is currently the only military in the world to widely employ such protection systems. 
Hence, the agents equipped with APS in the simulation would have an advantage of a 
50% hit probability reduction by incoming projectiles. 
3. Presence of Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) 
ERA has been employed by many militaries around the globe as an asymmetric 
means of improving the protection of their vehicles without increasing the weight of the 
vehicle drastically. The ERA prevents the incoming hostile projectile from hitting the 
vehicle by detonating its explosive when impacted by the projectile, causing the 
projectile to be destroyed or deviated, hence rendering it ineffective at penetrating the 





Figure 16.  M2 Bradley AFV Mounted with ERA Cassettes (from Osborn 2007).  
As the ERA is mounted on vehicles in the form of tiles called “cassette,” it must 
be noted that once an ERA cassette is hit, it is not regenerative and a hit in the same area 
would offer no additional protection. However, short of using a tandem shaped-charge 
projectile, hitting the same spot twice is unlikely under combat conditions. Hence, in this 
simulation, agents equipped with ERA are given the property of requiring three hits 
before the hostile projectile is able to penetrate the vehicle. 
4. Mobility Percentage 
Mobility of vehicles is an important attribute to its capability. Mobility is also 
viewed as a form of passive defense as it is increasingly difficult to track, engage, and hit 
a target moving with increasing velocity (Sher, Refael and Luria 1988). The addition of 
protection capabilities such as passive armor and ERA cassettes would no doubt increase 
the weight of the vehicle and correspondingly decrease the mobility of the vehicle 
(Morris n.d.).  
Hence, it is in the interest of this research to vary the mobility of the agents from 
100% of original mobility to 60% of their original mobility value. This is referenced from 
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the author’s experience as an armored vehicle operator and background in the defense 
industry. 
5. Signature Management Measures 
Signature Management Measures is another asymmetric effort in improving the 
survivability of the vehicle without piling on extra weight and reducing mobility. 
Signature Management Measures are applied in the form of thermo-variable tiles, as 
illustrated inError! Reference source not found.which can be mounted on the vehicle to 
manage and reduce its thermal and infrared red emissions, rendering it more “stealthy” 
and harder to detect by the adversary (Armada 2013).  
 
Figure 17.  Thermo-Variable Tiles Mounted on a Combat Vehicle (CV) – 90 (from 
Armada 2013). 
The effect of reducing the signature emissions of the vehicles mounted with the 
thermo-variable tiles is that the vehicles are significantly harder to be detected and 
targeted by the thermal and infrared sighting systems that are employed on the 
adversary’s armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons, as illustrated in Figure 18. This in 
turn, improves the vehicle’s survivability. In the interest of the simulations, agents with 
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Signature Management Measures employed would have an arbitrary value of 30% 
reduction in probability of being detected and targeted by adversary agents. 
 
Figure 18.  The center picture demonstrates the vast reduction in the vehicle’s 
thermal and infrared red signature with the employment of Signature Management 
Measures in the form of Thermo-Variable tiles (from Armada 2013). 
6. Presence of Additional Sensor (UAV) 
The additional sensor deployed in the simulation exists in the form of a RAVEN 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) as shown in Figure 19. The UAV is capable of 
undertaking Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) tasks and providing 
real-time intelligence on enemy dispositions to the BLUE Forces agents (Oestergaard 
2014), thus enhancing their situational awareness and enabling the ground platforms to 
avoid enemy strongholds or capitalize on weakness in enemy’s defense. 
 
Figure 19.  RQ-11 RAVEN UAV. 
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It is in the interest of this study to investigate how the presence of increased 
combat intelligence and improved situational awareness affects survivability of the 
armored vehicles and the probability of achieving mission success in an urban 
environment. Hence, the UAV agent is activated and present in certain sets of 
simulations. 
7. Force Structure 
For a military outfit to undertake and be successful in a Full Spectrum Operations 
(FSO), including urban operations, it must be capable of swapping and changing its force 
structure quickly. The ability to quickly change its force structure is also paramount to 
maintaining and improving its combat power (United States Army 2008).  
It is in the interest of this study to vary the constituent and force structure of the 
Armored Company Team that is tasked to capture the urban objective in the simulation. 
The degree of force structure of the Armored Company Team is limited to three armored 
platoons, ranging from the force structure of having purely MBT platoons (four vehicles 
each) to having two Bradley AFV platoons (three vehicles each) and 1 Stryker ICV 
platoon (three vehicles each). Having a heavier force structure for an Armored Company 
Team would improve its vulnerability and at the same time, with better firepower, it can 
take out enemy units more effectively and hence reduce its probability of being targeted 
by the enemy.  
Table 4.  illustrates the eight different sets of force structures used in the 
simulation, along with their assigned value for the conduct of design of experiment and 




Table 4.   Force Structure of the Armored Company Team and its associated 
number of vehicles. 
D. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
A DOE is required for the conduct of the study. DOE allows the logical, 
systematic, and intelligent conduct of simulations that involves numerous factors and 
design points. It allows the study to fully define and explore the design space, hence 
allowing the simulation to have the best chance of generating significant results that 
address the research questions.  
A robust DOE can be accomplished by using factorial designs. Factorial designs 
allow the analysis of more than one factor at a time. Through the analysis, the important 
factors and their interactions can be identified and singled out for further study and 
analysis (Sanchez 2005).  
The full factorial design is a 2
k
 factorial design, where k is the number of factors. 
Each factor has only two levels of inputs, namely High and Low. This basic DOE 
approach allows quick and thorough examination and coverage of the extreme and 
boundaries of the entire design space. Hence, a full factorial design of seven factors 
would entail 128 sets of design points (2
7
 = 128). The DOE software, MINITAB, was 
used to generate the 128 sets of design points that made up the initial set of simulations 
for this study. 
Once the important factors were identified using regression analysis, the factors 
were decomposed into finer levels of inputs to reveal more insights and complexities of 
Force Structure (Number of Platoons) Value for DOE Number of Vehicles
3 M1A2 MBT 8 12
2 M1A2 MBT + 1 Bradley AFV 7 11
2 M1A2 MBT + 1 Stryker ICV 6 11
1 M1A2 MBT + 2 Bradley AFV 5 10
3 Bradley AFV 4 9
1 M1A2 MBT + 1 Bradley AFV + 1 Stryker ICV 3 10
1 M1A2 MBT + 2 Stryker ICV 2 10
2 Bradley AFV + 1 Stryker ICV 1 9
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the entire design space. The downside to this is that a massively large number of design 
points will be generated and require substantial effort and time for a complete execution 
of the simulations. 
To circumvent this, the space filling property of the Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube (NOLH) was being utilized to sieve out the more important and significant 
design points. This allowed more factors to be included within a fixed sample size with 
good space-filling properties. Good space-filling DOE is defined as one where the design 
points are scattered throughout the experimental region with minimal unsampled region 
(Cioppa and Lucas 2007). As a result, 129 sets of design points were constructed for the 
refined set of simulations. In addition, the space filling properties of the entire design of 




Figure 20.  NOLH for the final simulation runs. 
As observed in Figure 20. generated using the statistical software JMP Pro 10, the 
set of design points is well spread out and fills the design space adequately. While the 
space filling outcome for the design factors of Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) and 
Active Protection System (APS) may appear vacant, it must be noted that they are two-
state factors, which means the simulation is only affected by their presence or absence. 
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Hence, the design space involving ERA and APS was actually well sampled in the two 
extremes by the NOLH. 
E. DATA FARMING AND ANALYSIS 
The data obtained from MANA was analyzed using statistical software, JMP Pro 
10. The motivations for using this particular software were that this software is 
appropriate for the study as it allows the thorough regression analysis of the large amount 
of simulation results. In addition, the software generates good and intuitive graphics for 
easy comprehension. 
The data was analyzed using regression analysis (Princeton University 2007) to 
identify the main effects and their important interactions in determining the outcomes of 
the four important MOEs, which essentially is the gist of the research, which will be 
explained in later chapters. The results from the analysis provide insights and serve as a 
guide to military planners and commanders on the employment of their military assets, in 




IV. COMBAT OPERATIONS 
In any military campaign, the armored forces would be expected to operate in 
several tactical scenarios such as taking part in offensive or defense operations.  
A. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
Offensive operations are the decisive form of battle. The primary purpose of the 
offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize an enemy force. A commander may also take 
offensive actions to deceive or divert the enemy, deprive him of resources or decisive 
terrain, develop intelligence, or hold an enemy in position. Armor forces are especially 
well suited to perform this operation (United States Army 2013). 
B. MISSION SETS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
Armor forces are especially well suited and adaptive in performing the high 
tempo and high mobility missions or tasks that are typical of offensive operations. The 
sets of missions that are associated with the conduct of offensive operations are the 
following (United States Army 2013). 
1. Attack 
2. Frontal Attack 




7. Appropriate March Techniques 
This paper explores and researches the operation for an Armored Company Team 
to attack and capture an urban objective, which involves all the listed mission sets. These 
are related to the operational activities for offensive operations described in Chapter II as 
the attack and capture of an urban objective is indeed an offensive operation. 
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C. URBAN ENVIRONMENT 
An urban area is defined as the area of a city. Most of the urban area’s populace 
has nonagricultural jobs. Urban areas are highly developed, with a high density of man-
made structures such as buildings, roads, bridges, and railways (GlobalSecurity.org 
2006). 
(1) Buildings and Infrastructures 
Operating in an urban environment poses several considerations. The most 
obvious is the presence of a large number of densely situated buildings. The buildings 
provide cover and concealment and, at the same time, severely limit the field of 
observations and fire. The presence of the buildings also imposes restrictions on the 
movement of troops and vehicles. In addition, the buildings provide a third dimension of 
combat by allowing engagements to be initiated and take place from rooftops. 
(2) Roads and Streets 
The presence of roads and streets is another characteristic of the urban 
environment. They provide avenues of approach and facilitate the movement of vehicles. 
However, the roads and streets often are canalized by the presence of buildings and the 
urban terrain offers little mounted maneuverability off the roads and streets. 
(3) Airspace 
The airspace over the urban terrain offers the unique ability of rapid deployment 
of troops and forces. The air assets have more freedom of movement, as compared to 
ground forces, as they are less affected by the physical constraints posed by the buildings 
and infrastructures.  
(4) Civilians 
The unavoidable consequence of operating in an urban environment is the close 
proximity of a large number of civilian non-combatants. This poses significant problems 
and restrictions to the ethical military commander. Issues of target legitimacy remain 
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debatable. In the recent Israel and Hamas conflict in the Gaza strip, it is notable that a 
significant number of civilians became casualties of war.  
(5) Impedance for Armor Forces 
Armor forces were designed to operate in high tempo and mobility operations in 
an open terrain. Their characteristic heavy firepower, mobility, and longer range of 
observations and engagement are severely limited in the urban environment where these 
attributes are significantly degraded. The restrictions for effective armor operations in 
urban terrain would spell impending doom to the crew of an armored vehicle as it 
becomes trapped and falls victim in the urban terrain (Urban Warfare Special 2006). 
D. GROUND PLATFORMS OVERVIEW 
The ground military units that are used in the research and simulation are 
discussed in the following section. 
1. BLUE Forces 
The ground combat platforms for the BLUE forces are classified as Main Battle 
Tanks (MBT), Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV), and Infantry Carrying Vehicles (ICVs). 
While it is difficult to get an accurate value for the armor thickness of each vehicle type, 
the main battle tanks have the thickest armor, followed by the armored fighting vehicles 
and the infantry carrying vehicle. The openly accepted value of the armor thickness of the 
hulls of the various types of armored vehicles is stated in the following sections. 
(1) Main Battle Tanks (MBT) 
The MBT used in this simulation is the M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank. The 
MBT boasts a 120mm Main Gun that fires the Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding 
Sabot-Tracer (APFSDS-T) and High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) ammunition. In 
addition, the secondary armament of the M1A2 MBT includes a .50 caliber Machine 
Gun, a co-axially mounted 7.62mm Machine Gun, and a 7.62mm Loader’s Machine Gun. 
The MBT has the heaviest armor complement of all ground platforms and the armor 
thickness of its hull is equivalent to 960mm of rolled homogenous armor (RHA). The 
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vehicle is fully tracked and is operated by a crew of four (Kable Intelligence Limited 
2014). A pictorial illustration of the M1A2 MBT is shown in Figure 21.  
 
Figure 21.  M1A2 Main Battle Tank (from Yap 2012). 
(2) Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) 
The Armored Fighting Vehicle used in this simulation is the M2 Bradley. The 
vehicle boasts a 25mm cannon with a complement of the Tube Launched, Optical 
Tracked and Wire Guided (TOW) Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM). It has a lighter 
armor outfit as compared to the M1A2 MBT and the armor thickness of its hull is 
equivalent to 500mm of RHA. The M2 Bradley is operated by a crew of three and has the 
capacity to carry six fully equipped infantry soldiers (Army Technology 2014). A 




Figure 22.  M2 Bradley AFV (from Yap 2012). 
b. Infantry Carrying Vehicles (ICV) 
The Stryker is used as the Infantry Carrying Vehicle in the simulation. Its 
armament consists of a .50 caliber machine gun and a 40mm Automatic Grenade 
Launcher. The vehicle has the lightest armor in the suite of ground platforms used in the 
simulation and the armor thickness of its hull is equivalent to 250mm of RHA. The 
Stryker is wheeled and boasts the capability of operating quietly in an urban environment 
as compared to tracked vehicles. The Stryker is also capable of carrying a squad of fully 
equipped infantry soldiers (Army Technology 2013). A pictorial illustration of the 




Figure 23.  Stryker Infantry Carrying Vehicle (from Army Technology 2013). 
2. Threats 
Ground military platforms are subjected to a wide spectrum of threats from all 
dimensions. The main threats present themselves in the form of adversary Main Battle 
Tanks and Armored Vehicles, Anti-Tank Weapons, Improvised Explosive Devices, and 
mines. This list is by no means exhaustive and the following section discusses the ground 
threats faced by the Armored Company Team. 
(1) Adversary Main Battle Tanks and Armored Vehicles 
The best way to defeat an armored vehicle is to use another armored vehicle of 
similar or heavier class. The enemy armored vehicles used in this simulation are the T-90 
MBT and the BMP-2 AFV. These adversary armored vehicles have similar 
characteristics, protection, mobility, and firepower as their counterparts in the BLUE 
forces. 
(2) Anti-Tank Weapons 
The Anti-Tank Weapons used in the research are the Rocket-Propelled Grenades 
(RPG) and the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) such as the Milan. The RPGs are 
shoulder-launched weapons with a High Explosive Shaped Charge to defeat the armor of 
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the ground platforms. It has a relatively short range and inferior accuracy. The RPG used 
in the simulation is the RGP-29 (Defense Update 2006). 
For ATGMs, the damage mechanism is through the means of a high-explosive 
warhead contained in the missile. The ATGM has a longer range as compared to the RPG 
and a higher accuracy due to the presence of visual or imaging infrared seekers installed 
in the missile. The ATGM is man portable and can also be installed on vehicles 
(abcNEWS 2014). 
(3) Mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) 
Anti-Tank Mines feature high-explosive warheads. They are designed to be 
deployed on the ground and where the pressure or vibrations from an armored vehicle 
triggers its detonation when the vehicle rolls over the mines unknowingly. The mines are 
designed to attack the weakest part of the armor, which is found at the under belly of the 
vehicle (Bonsor 2012). 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as the name suggests, are made of 
haphazard materials and are essentially homemade bombs. Their damage mechanism 
ranges from high explosives to shaped charges and explosively formed penetrators. They 
function similarly to the anti-tank mines, relying on concealment and surprise to prey on 
the unsuspecting crews of armored vehicles (National Academies 2012). 
(4) Technicals 
Technicals are haphazardly modified trucks or automobiles that are outfitted with 
weaponry ranging from the .50 caliber machine gun, RPG toting insurgents, or the even 
more deadly ATGMs. They have little or no armor protection and rely on their high 
mobility and ambush tactics to survive and destroy their targets (Somaiya 2010). 
(5) Small Arms 
Although most of the heavy armored vehicles such as the MBTs are impervious to 
small arms fire, AFVs and IFVs with their relatively lighter armor are still susceptible to 
small arms such as the hardened steel core Armor-Piercing rounds from a 50 caliber 
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machine gun, which is commonly found on other armored vehicles or mounted on the 
back of a technical (Federation of American Scientist 1999). 
E. PROTECTION 
One of the functions of the armored vehicle is to survive in order to carry out its 
orders and accomplish its mission. To achieve that, it must have a credible and effective 
protection system installed. In general, the types of protection systems found on armored 
vehicles can be broadly classified into Passive and Active Protection Systems. 
1. Passive Protection 
Passive protection exists in the form of static armor which is a protective device 
that protects against kinetic and chemical energy ammunition by absorbing the energy of 
the projectile. It is the most prevalent and most basic form of protection that is found on 
armored vehicles (Kwok and Lim 2013). Common types of Passive Armor are made of 
armor steel materials or composite materials such as: 
1. Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA) 
2. High Hardness Steel (HHS) 
3. Laminate Armor  
4. Composite Armor 
5. Slat Armor 
2. Active Protection 
Active protection is defined as a system that is employed to prevent anti-armor 
line of sight weapons from acquiring or destroying a target. Active protection is often 
classified into Hard Kill, where it destroys the incoming threat decisively, or Soft Kill, 
where it prevents the threat from hitting or destroying the target al.though touted to be 
more effective than the passive armor, active protection is largely limited to its inherent 
high cost which prevents its prevalent employment. Systems such as Explosive Reactive 
Armor, Trophy, Iron Fist, and Iron Curtain are common APS (Armada 2013). 
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a. Hard Kill Active Protection System 
The Hard Kill APS employs the concept of destroying the incoming projectile 
before it hits the armored vehicle. It functions by having a sensor which detects the 
incoming projectile and by making split second calculations; the APS launches a 
projectile of its own to intercept the hostile projectile and destroy it, thereby preventing 
the armored vehicle from being hit. In the recent Israel and Hamas conflict in the Gaza 
strip, there were confirmations and reports of an APS, Trophy, mounted on the Israel 
Merkava MBT intercepting an RPG that was fired at it. This validates the concept and 
effectiveness of the APS (Armada 2013). Figure 24. illustrates the chronology of events 
of a generic active protection system and Figure 25. illustrates the mounting of an APS 
on a MBT. 
 
Figure 24.  Chronology of events for the functioning of a generic Hard-Kill Active 




Figure 25.  APS (Trophy) mounted on a Merkava Mk 3 of the Israel Defense Forces 
(from Armada 2013). 
b. Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) 
The ERA consists of an explosive liner that is placed in between two metal plates 
in the form of a “cassette.” The ERA is typically mounted on the hull and turret of the 
armor vehicles as that is the area that is most likely to be subjected to hits by hostile 
projectiles. The explosive liner is detonated upon impact by an incoming projectile, 
creating energy that defeats or deflects the hostile projectile, thereby reducing its 
effectiveness and protecting the armored vehicle (Osborn 2007). 
There are other APS available such as the counter measures for electronic 
warfare. However, they were not included in the simulation and remain a source for 
future work in this area of research.  
F. SENSORS 
To sense and detect enemy and friendly forces is an essential function of any 
armored vehicle. The sensors are broadly classified into Armored Vehicle Sensors and 
the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in this study. 
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(1) Armored Vehicle Sensors 
An armored vehicle is typically equipped with an optical primary sensor that is 
being used to obtain its target and for aiming purposes when operating the main weapon 
system. The primary sensor is augmented by a thermal sensor that detects and tracks 
targets by the temperature difference with the ambient environment. This secondary 
sensor often has a lesser degree of magnification but a wider field of view as compared to 
the primary optical sensor (Foo 2014). 
(2) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
The UAV functions as an additional sensor to the armored vehicle. It is often 
deployed in orbit above the area of operations and transmits information of enemy 
activities and deployments back to the friendly forces to enhance their situational 
awareness and decision making process. This is being done using electro-optics and 
infrared red sensors. 
G. FORCE STRUCTURE OF ARMORED COMPANY TEAM 
Military task forces are inherently made up of smaller, independent tactical units. 
Military commanders on the ground often have the prerogative to alter an Armored 
Company Team’s organic and assigned assets to provide better resources to their 
subordinate commanders for the mission at hand. The alteration of the Armored 
Company Team’s organization is also often precipitated by the need for better command 
and control based on the situation (United States Army 2005). 
For the purpose of this research, the Armored Company Team has the option of 
eight different force structure combinations of varying strength and firepower, which will 
be further elaborated in Chapter V.  
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V. SCENARIO MODELING 
The motivation, considerations, and constraints in developing the operational 
scenario are discussed in this chapter. 
A. HYPOTHETICAL OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
The scenario used in the modeling portion of the research is that of an operation 
undertaken by an Armored Combat Team (BLUE Forces), with variation in force 
structure and consisting of three armored platoons, to capture an urban terrain objective, 
OBJ MEGAN. The scenario map used in the simulation measures approximately 10 
miles by 7 miles. The attackers (BLUE Forces), aided with an UAV, start the operation 
by attacking from the east. Their task of capturing OBJ MEGAN will be considered 
successful upon capturing one of the two land links across the river at the western edge of 
the objective or with the destruction of the defenders’ forces. The BLUE forces faced a 
numerically superior enemy force (RED Forces), consisting a mixture of MBTs, AFVs, 
troops with anti-tank weapons, technical, mines, and IEDs. The RED Forces were dug in 













Figure 26.  Initial layout of BLUE and RED Forces for the simulation of an attack operation by an Armor Combat Team to 
capture an urban objective using MANA.
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B. REAL LIFE REFERENCE 
An example of the modern military’s violent and successful assault on and 
capture of an urban terrain using purely armored forces is documented in the book titled 
Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad. The city of Baghdad was taken 
by a surprise assault by the Second Brigade of the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) 
using three battalions of a mixture of M1A2 MBTs and Bradley AFVs (Zucchino 2004).  
In addition, the recent Israel-Palestinian conflict has provided many references 
and instances that depict and reinforce the notion of frequent fighting in an urban 
environment (Associated Press 2014). These two examples laid the foundation and 
motivation for the construction of the modeling scenario for the research. 
C. OPERATIONAL ORDERS 
A short snippet of the typical operational orders issued to an Armored Combat 
Team Commander for assault operations is included to provide a better understanding of 
the modeling scenario. An operation overlay is provided in Figure 27. to facilitate the 
understanding of the scenario. Error! Reference source not found.provides the 
meanings of the military symbols used in the operations overlay. 









The most significant natural obstacle is the river at the western edge of the Area 
of Operations (AO). There are several water bodies that are dispersed throughout the AO. 
There are no significant man made obstacles in the AO. However, protective obstacles in 
the form of concertina wires around the buildings in the objective can be expected. In 
addition, IEDs and undetected mines can be expected in the AO as well. 
(2) Avenue 
In general, the AO can be easily approached by armored forces as it is comprised 
mainly of desert terrain. There are two main paved roads in the AO – one running from 
the north to south while the other runs from the east to the west across the AO. The east 
to west paved road is identified as the main avenue of approach into the urban objective. 
The intersection of the two paved roads denotes the eastern most boundary of the 
objective.  
(3) Key Terrain 
The Key Terrain is identified as the two land link or bridges across the river at the 
western edge of the objective. This is because the land links facilitate the reinforcement, 
resupply and withdrawal of the defenders of the objective.  
(4) Observations 
The general terrain of the AO offers good observation due to its relatively flat 
gradient. However, once inside the urban environment, fields of observations and fires 
will be severely restricted by the presence of a large number of buildings and structures. 
(5) Cover and Concealment 
The general terrain of the AO offers very poor cover and concealment, due to its 
open dessert like terrain. However, cover and concealment drastically improves once 
inside the urban terrain due to the presence of large number of buildings and structures 
that offer good cover and concealment. 
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2. Enemy Situation 
(1) General Enemy Situation 
In the past 120 hours, RED forces have dug in and fortified OBJ MEGAN in an 
effort to halt the advance of BLUE forces westward.  
(2) Composition and Strength 
The enemy is comprised of a Battalion that is made up of T-90 MBTs and BMP-2 
AFVs, along with an unidentified number of anti-tank weapons from dismounted troops 
and technicals. 
The enemy is organized into a screening force and the main defense force. The 
screening force is expected to be made up of technicals mounted with anti-tank weapons 
that conduct patrols on the eastern and northern edge of the objective. 
The main bulk of the RED forces make up the main defense force, consisting of 
up to two platoons of T-90 MBTs and three platoons BMP-2 AFVs, along with 
dismounted troops and technicals with anti-tank weapons. The RED forces are expected 
to deploy mines and IEDs to disrupt the BLUE forces advance. 
(3) End State 
The RED forces are envisioned that at the end state of the conflict to be achieving 
victory, with the repulsion and destruction of the advancing BLUE forces, with the 
objective being intact to the RED force. 
3. Friendly Situation 
(1) Brigade Commander’s Intent 
The Brigade Commander’s Intent is to secure at least one break out point in the 






(2) Battalion Commander’s Intent 
The Battalion Commander’s Intent is to capture the urban objective to the east of 
the river in the AO in order to secure a breakout point for the passage of follow-on forces 
no later than (NLT) 011500 hours (Day 01 and Time 1500). 
4. Mission 
B/1-2 is to capture OBJ MEGAN NLT 011500 hours in order to facilitate the 
passage of follow-on forces. 
5. Execution 
(1) Commander’s Intent 
The Company Commander’s intent is to rapidly capture OBJ MEGAN and the 
two land links across the river to the west of the objective, while inflicting maximum 
casualties to the RED forces at the same time. 
(2) Operation’s Purpose 
This will allow the rapid collapse of the RED force’s defense in OBJ MEGAN 
and facilitate the capture of OBJ MEGAN to allow the passage of follow on forces. 
(3) Concept of Operation 
This operation is achieved by an envelopment assault on OBJ MEGAN. This 
operation is supported by an UAV to provide real-time intelligence and information. 
(4) End state 
End states of the operations are: 
(5) Own Forces 
BLUE Forces to remain combat effective (less than one-third of its forces attrited) 
at the end of the operation. 
(6) Enemy 




One of the two land links across the river secured by the BLUE Force. 
D. CONDITIONS FOR MISSION SUCCESS 
All military operations will have a goal or objective in mind as mandated in the 
Principles of War (United States Army 2008). The conditions for military success must 
be clearly defined and attainable, and in this instance, the objectives are two-fold and 
achieving either will constitute mission success. 
1. Destruction of 50% of Enemy (RED) Forces 
The destruction of half of the defending enemy forces will conclude the capture of 
the urban objective. Being rendered combat ineffective and unable to hold and defend the 
objective effectively, the defense of the urban terrain by the RED forces will be untenable 
and the BLUE forces will have achieved its mission of capturing the urban objective. 
2. Isolation of Enemy Forces by Capturing the Two Bridges across the 
River 
From the perspective of the defender (RED forces), the main consideration of 
defensive operations, other than repelling the attackers would be to prevent being cut off 
or isolated by the attackers (BLUE forces). Isolation can rapidly cause a drastic drop in 
morale and military options for soldiers and commanders and precipitate the downfall of 
the entire defensive operation (United States Army 2008).  
Hence, in this modeled scenario, the arrival of the BLUE forces’ agents at the two 
bridges spanning the river in the western portion of the objective and capturing them 
would effectively isolate the RED forces in defense. This would render their defense 
untenable and facilitate an early downfall of their defensive positions as the RED forces 
have no choice but to give up their defensive positions and fall back. 
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E. AGENTS SUMMARY 
Table 6.  summarizes the number and type of agents (both BLUE and RED 
forces) that are used in the simulations. The parameters of all the agent attributes used in 
the simulation are illustrated in Appendix A. 
Table 6.   Summary of agents used in the simulations. 
 
It must be noted that the table tabulates the number of agents that are being used 
in the simulations. The number is accurate for the RED forces for each different set of 
simulation as the strength of the RED forces is not one of the factors being studied and 
hence their numbers are not varied. 
However, for the BLUE forces, the number of agents varies from nine to 12. A 
platoon of M1A2 MBTs consists of four vehicles while a Bradley or Stryker platoon 
consists of three vehicles each. Hence, depending on the force structure of the three 
platoons that constitute the Armored Combat Team, the number of BLUE ground agents 
can range from 12 agents, when task organized as a pure MBT Combat Team, or nine 
agents when task organized otherwise. This will be further elaborated in Chapter VI. 
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VI. RESULTS ANALYSIS 
The purpose of the simulations was to determine the design factors of an Armored 
Company Team that are significant in determining the outcome of the four previously 
discussed MOEs. As a recap, the seven design factors are Armor Thickness (%), Presence 
of Active Protection System, Presence of Explosive Reactive Armor, Mobility (%), 
Presence of Signature Management Measures, Presence of Additional Sensors, and Force 
Structure. In addition, the four MOEs are Percentage of BLUE Casualties, Force 
Exchange Ratio, Probability of Completing Mission, and Time Steps taken to Complete 
Mission. 
A. INDICATORS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, the analysis of the simulation results was 
performed with the statistical software, JMP Pro 10. JMP Pro 10 takes all the factors used 
in the simulation and the associated results into account when performing regression 
analysis and attempts to fit a regression line for all the data points by generating a 
prediction of the results based on the interactions of the factors. The fidelity of the 
regression model, magnitude of effects of each factor, and their significance to the result 
of the MOES were then presented in the form of graphs and tables. Figure 28. illustrates 
and explains the generic output of JMP Pro 10 when performing the analysis of the 




Figure 28.  JMP output example. 
The following two measures were used to indicate and measure the significance 
of the results obtained. 
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1. R2 Value 
The coefficient of determinant, also known as the R
2
 value, provides a goodness-
of-fit measure. It indicates the proportion of the total variation of a dependent variable 
around its average that is accounted for by the independent variable in a regression 
function (Ragsdale 2012). The R
2
 value ranges from the lowest value of 0 to the 
maximum value of 1.  
The analysis of the simulation data was performed with the fitting of a regression 
line. A high R
2
 value would indicate that the data points are closer to the fitted regression 
line. This implies that most of the observed data can be explained by the fitted model. A 
R
2
 value that can be considered “good” is typically above 0.7 (Hayter 2012). 
2. t-Statistic 
The “discrepancy” between the data set and the null hypothesis is 
measured through a t-statistic (Hayter 2012, 354). 
The value of the t-statistic lies in the fact that it provides a probability of any 
further data point that will fall outside of the notional range of value at a certain 
confidence interval (Hayter 2012), assuming that the null hypothesis is correct. For 
example, at a 95% confidence interval for any set of data under regression analysis, a t-
statistic of value 0.01 would mean that there is only a 1% probability that any further 
observed data would fall outside the boundary of the notional range of 95% of all data 
points. A value of t-statistic that is larger than (1 – 95%) would render the factor 
insignificant. Hence, the smaller the value of the t-statistic, the more likely is it to be 
close to the notional value and the more significant it is. As the analysis of results uses a 
95% confidence interval, factors with a t-statistic value of less than 0.05 would be 




B. INITIAL SIMULATION RESULTS 
A total of 128 different sets of simulations, each with 50 repetitions, were 
conducted as an initial foray into the research. The results were analyzed using the 
statistical software, JMP Pro 10, and the analysis is discussed in the subsequent 
paragraphs. The generated design points for the initial simulations, along with the 
simulation results, are illustrated in Appendix B. 
(1) Main Effect Model 
During the analysis of the results from the initial simulations, only the Main 
Effects, which are effects of individual factors without any interactions with other factors, 
of the model were being considered. 
(2) Analysis of Main Effects on MOEs 




(3) Percentage BLUE Casualties 
As observed in both Figure 29. and Figure 30. the model has a good fit with a 
high R
2
 value of 0.75836. This means that a large proportion of the data points (actual 
results from the simulation) are being accounted for and explained by the predicted 
model that is used to fit the regression line, and the model is accurate in predicting the 
outcomes of the MOE. In addition, the factors that are significant in determining the 
outcome of this particular MOE (at 95% confidence interval) are Armor Thickness (%), 
Presence of APS, Presence of ERA, Mobility (%), and Force Structure as the value of 










Figure 30.  Parameter estimates for MOE – % BLUE Casualties.
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b. Force Exchange Ratio 
As observed in both Figure 31. and Figure 32. the model has a good fit with a 
high R
2
 value of 0.746795. This means that a large proportion of the data points (actual 
results from the simulation) are being accounted for and explained by the predicted 
model that is used to fit the regression line, and the model is accurate in predicting the 
outcomes of the MOE. In addition, the factors that are significant in determining the 
outcome of this particular MOE are Armor Thickness (%), Presence of APS, Presence of 
ERA, and Force Structure as the value of their respective t-statistic (Prob > |t|) is below 











Figure 32.  Parameter estimates for MOE – FER.
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c. Probability of Completing Mission 
As observed in both Figure 33. and Figure 34. the model has an average fit with 
an R
2
 value of 0.589924. This means that approximately half of the data points (actual 
results from the simulation) are being accounted for and explained by the predicted 
model that is used to fit the regression line, and the model is less accurate in predicting 
the outcome of the MOE. In addition, the factors that are significant in determining the 
outcome of this particular MOE are Armor Thickness (%), Presence of APS, Presence of 













Figure 34.  Parameter estimates for MOE – Probability of Completing Mission.
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d. Time Steps taken to Complete Mission 
As observed in both Figure 35. and Figure 36. the model has an excellent fit with 
a high R
2
 value of 0.935199. This means that almost all of the data points (actual results 
from the simulation) are being accounted for and explained by the predicted model that is 
used to fit the regression line, and the model is very accurate in predicting the outcome of 
this MOE. In addition, the factors that are significant in determining the outcome of this 
particular MOE are Armor Thickness (%), Presence of APS, Presence of ERA, Mobility 
(%), and Force Structure as the value of their respective t-statistic (Prob > |t|) is below 












Figure 36.  Parameter estimates for MOE – Time steps taken to Complete Mission.
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e. Most Important Main Effects 
It can be observed from the previous analysis that each MOE has largely the same 
design factors that are significant in determining its outcome. A summary of the initial 
results is provided in Table 7.   
Table 7.   Summary of design factors that are significant in determining the 
outcome of the respective MOEs based on t-statistic values (Green = 
Very Significant, Yellow = Significant, Orange = Not so Significant, 
Red = Not Significant) 
 
 
f. Insignificant Factors 
While the significance of the factors Armor Thickness (%), Presence of APS, 
Presence of ERA, Mobility (%), and Force Structure will be discussed after further and 
more refined analysis, the insignificance of the two factors in any of the four MOEs, 
Presence of Signature Management and Presence of Additional Sensors, warrants an 
explanation. 
(1) Presence of Signature Management 
As previously discussed, the urban terrain is a very cluttered and dense 
environment, with range of observation and engagement often being limited to less than a 
few hundred meters. The effect of Signature Management is largely to minimize the 
Armor 
Thickness %





















infrared (IR) signature of the armored vehicle and reduce its detection by the adversary’s 
thermal sighting system from a distance away.  
This effect is largely negated in the urban environment as the acquiring of targets 
is often being accomplished by the naked eye and the optical sighting system present on 
the platform, due to the short distances of observation and engagement presented by the 
urban clutter.  
Hence, the presence of Signature Management measures does little to contribute 
to reducing the casualties count and the Force Exchange Ratio. The increase in friendly 
casualties will result in the reduction of combat fit units and no doubt lead to the 
reduction in the ability of the unit to accomplish its mission and the time taken to do so. 
(2) Presence of Additional Sensor 
The insignificance of having an additional sensor can again be attributed to the 
unique and cluttered characteristics of an urban environment. No doubt having an 
additional sensor in the form of an UAV will provide the ground forces with an increased 
detection range; the urban environment permits only short engagement ranges of less than 
a few hundred meters. The advantage of being able to “see” far is negated by the inability 
of the ground units to shoot far in an urban environment. 
Hence, the presence of an additional sensor does little to affect the results of the 
engagements and is insignificant in the determination of the outcomes of the various 
MOEs. 
C. REFINED SIMULATION RESULTS 
Based on the results of the initial simulations, where the following design factors 
Armor Thickness (%), Presence of APS, Presence of ERA, Mobility (%), and Force 
Structure are determined to be significant, a further refined sets of design points were 
obtained using the NOLH as discussed in Chapter III. This approach further generated 
129 sets of different simulations, each with 50 repetitions to ensure statistical 
significance. The results were also analyzed using JMP Pro 10 and are discussed in the 
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following sections. The generated design points for the refined simulations, along with 
the simulation results, are illustrated in Appendix B. 
1. Pair Wise Analysis of Results Based on MOEs 
The author acknowledges that it is insufficient to merely analyze the main effects 
of the five significant factors on the MOEs. Analysis of the interactions and combined 
effects of the factors must be performed for a more holistic and accurate study. 
a. Percentage BLUE Casualties 
Based on Figure 37. the model is deemed to have a good fit with a high R
2
 value 
of 0.861881. This means that a large proportion of the data points (actual results from the 
simulation) are being accounted for and explained by the predicted model that is used to 
fit the regression line, and the model is accurate in predicting the outcomes of the MOE.  
It is also observed from Figure 38. that there are ten factors and combinations of 
factors with Prob >|t| smaller than 0.05. This means that there is more than 95% 
confidence that the factors or combinations of factors are really significant in affecting 
the output of the MOE.  
However, there are several factors that are beneficial (decreasing the percentage 
casualties of BLUE forces) in terms of improving the MOE while some are detrimental 










Figure 38.  Effects of the factors and combinations on MOE - % BLUE Casualties. 
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(1) Beneficial Factors and Combinations 
The following factors are beneficial to the outcome of the MOE: 
 Armor Thickness (%) 
 Presence of Active Protection System (APS) 
 Presence of Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) 
The armor of a vehicle and the presence of ERA or APS are the attributes that are 
designed to increase the survivability of the vehicle. Hence, it is of no surprise that with 
increasing Armor Thickness, having the presence of APS or ERA, will improve the MOE 
and reduce the percentage of casualties taken by the BLUE units. 
(2) Mobility (%) 
Mobility, as discussed earlier, can be viewed as a form of passive defensive 
measures. The axiom of the faster the target is moving, the more difficult it is to hit the 
target is apparent in this instance. Hence, increasing the Mobility of a vehicle will 
improve the chances of it not being hit and becoming a casualty. 
(3) Force Structure 
In terms of Force Structure, the higher the assigned number, the more “powerful” 
is the force structure of the Armored Company Team. This will improve the lethality of 
the BLUE units, resulting in improved survivability and, in turn, benefits the MOE by 
reducing the casualties taken by the BLUE forces. 
(4) Detrimental Factors and Combinations 
The following combinations of factors are detrimental to the outcome of the MOE: 
 Armor Thickness (%) and Presence of ERA 
The detrimental effect of the combination of the factors Armor Thickness (%) and 
the Presence of ERA can be attributed to the fact that the interaction of the two factors 
negates the benefits of each individual factor. ERA was designed to circumvent the pitfall 
of having to continually increase the Armor Thickness for greater protection by providing 
an asymmetrical solution. Having ERA, which has substantial weight in itself, and yet 
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continually increasing the Armor Thickness will no doubt increase the total weight of the 
platform and decrease the mobility of the platform, hence subjecting the platform to a 
higher probability of being spotted, targeted, engaged, and hit by the enemy, leading to an 
increase in the casualties. 
 Presence of ERA and Presence of APS 
The detrimental combination of the factors Presence of ERA and Presence of APS 
can be explained by the fact that ERA and APS were each designed to be sufficient on its 
own. This would mean that the platform’s survivability should be improved satisfactorily 
with either one of the two defensive attributes. Combining both yields no significant 
benefits while it decreases the mobility of the platform due to the increase in weight, 
hence again increasing the number of casualties. 
 Mobility (%) and Presence of ERA 
The combination of Mobility (%) and Presence of ERA is detrimental as well. 
The increase in casualties taken by the BLUE forces can be attributed to the resulting 
decrease in mobility of the platforms. The presence of the ERA will increase the weight 
of the platform and hence decrease its mobility.  
 Mobility (%) and Force Structure 
The combination of Mobility (%) and Force Structure is detrimental. The increase 
in the assigned Force Structure number would entail a force structure of heavier 
platforms for the BLUE forces, which inherently reduces its mobility. With mobility 
being viewed as a passive defense, the resultant decrease in mobility of the platforms due 
to the combination of the factors contributed to an increase in the percentage of BLUE 
casualties. 
 Presence of ERA and Force Structure 
The detrimental effects of combining the Presence of ERA and Force Structure 
are intriguing. Intuitively, the presence of ERA and a heavier force structure would 
improve the survivability of the BLUE forces. However, this is not in agreement with the 
regression results and the deviation from the expected intuitive observations can be 
attributed to the fact that the presence of ERA and a heavier force structure again 
90 
 
decreases the mobility of the BLUE forces, resulting in the increase in number of 
casualties taken. 
 Effects of Factors 
As observed in Figure 38. it can be concluded that the factors Presence of ERA 
and Armor Thickness (%) have the largest degree of effect, based on their steeper 
gradient in the prediction profiler and the relatively minute value of the t-statistic on the 
determination of the outcome of the MOE. 
b. Force Exchange Ratio (FER) 
Based on Figure 39. the model is deemed to have an average fit with an R
2
 value 
of 0.458333. This means that approximately half of the data points (actual results from 
the simulation) are being accounted for and explained by the predicted model that is used 
to fit the regression line, and the model is reasonably accurate in predicting the outcome 
of the MOE.  
It also can be observed from Figure 40. that there are six factors and combinations 
of factors with Prob >|t| smaller than 0.05. This means that there is more than a 95% 
confidence that the factors or combinations of factors are really significant in affecting 












Figure 40.  Effects of the factors and combinations on MOE – FER. 
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(1) Beneficial Factors and Combinations 
The following factors are beneficial to the outcome of the MOE: 
 Armor Thickness (%) 
The increasing thickness in armor will improve the protection and defensive 
capability of the platforms, hence improving their survivability. This allows the platform 
to stay in the conflict for a longer period of time, giving it more opportunities to engage 
and destroy enemy forces and, hence, it yields an increase in the FER. It is noted that the 
results obtained contradict the aforementioned MOE. The disparity of the results warrants 
further detailed study with more refined and improved simulations and design of 
experiments. 
 Presence of ERA 
Likewise, the presence of ERA will improve the survivability of the platform by 
requiring more hits to destroy the platform. This allows the platform to stay in the 
conflict for a longer period of time, giving it more opportunities to engage and destroy 
enemy forces and, hence, it yields an increase in the FER.  
 Force Structure 
With a heavier Force Structure, not only do the BLUE forces have better 
protection, which leads to more units being able to stay in the fight and inflict damage to 
the enemy as explained earlier, the firepower of the BLUE forces also correspondingly 
increases. The increase in firepower no doubt would improve the lethality of the BLUE 
forces, allowing them to destroy more of the enemy and increase the FER. 
 Armor Thickness (%) and Presence of ERA 
The simultaneous increase in Armor Thickness and installation of ERA on the 
platforms will lead to the BLUE forces having more units in the conflict, which causes 
more damage to the enemy and improves the FER. The initial explanation is that the 
increase in Armor and Presence of ERA will allow the BLUE forces to survive better, 
hence having more units in combat longer and bringing more firepower to bear on the 
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enemy and increasing the FER. However, the contradiction of these results with MOE #1 
was noted and, as mentioned previously, this observation warrants further study. 
 Armor Thickness (%) and Force Structure 
The improvement in Armor Thickness and heavier Force Structure will 
concurrently improve the defensive capabilities and firepower of the BLUE forces. This 
improvement in Vulnerability and Lethality has the combined effect of allowing the 
BLUE forces to have more units in the fight to engage and destroy the enemies, which 
leads to an increase in the FER. 
 Presence of ERA and Force Structure 
Likewise, the presence of ERA and a heavier Force Structure will concurrently 
improve the defensive capabilities and firepower of the BLUE forces, allowing the BLUE 
forces to have more units in the fight to engage and destroy the enemies, which leads to 
an increase in the FER. 
(2) Effects of Factors 
As observed in Figure 40. , it can be concluded that the factors Force Structure 
and Presence of ERA have the largest degree of impact on improving the FER based on 
their steeper gradient in the prediction profiler and the relatively minute value of the t-
statistic. 
 Probability of Completing Mission 
Based on Figure 41. , the model is deemed to have a poor fit with a low R
2
 value 
of 0.299651. This means that only a small number of the data points (actual results from 
the simulation) are being accounted for and explained by the predicted model that is used 
to fit the regression line, and the model leaves much to be desired.  
It also can be observed from Figure 42. that there are five factors and 
combinations of factors with Prob >|t| smaller than 0.05. This means that there is more 
than a 95% confidence that the factors or combinations of factors are really significant in 










Figure 42.  Effects of the factors and combinations on MOE–Probability of Completing Mission. 
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(3) Beneficial Factors and Combinations 
The following factors are beneficial to the outcome of the MOE: 
 Mobility (%) 
Mobility, as discussed earlier, is perceived to be a passive defensive measure 
(Sher, Refael and Luria 1988). The higher the mobility of a platform, the faster it can 
move and the harder it is for an enemy to effectively spot, target, engage, and hit it. This, 
in turn, improves the survivability of the platform by decreasing its Susceptibility. With 
improved survivability, the BLUE forces would have more units in the mission, and 
hence, there is a greater probability of the mission being accomplished. 
 Presence of ERA and Presence of APS 
ERA and APS are defensive measures to improve the survivability of a platform 
by improving its Vulnerability and Susceptibility. The presence of either measure will 
allow the BLUE forces to reduce the number of casualties taken, which allows the BLUE 
forces to have more units in the operation. This, in turn, increases the probability of the 
BLUE forces accomplishing their mission. 
(4) Detrimental Factors and Combinations 
 Mobility (%) and Presence of ERA 
The presence of ERA, with its inherent substantial weight, will increase the total 
weight of the platform and hence decreases the platform’s mobility. With decrease in 
mobility, the BLUE forces are more likely to be engaged and destroyed by the enemy, 
rendering it to have fewer units that are combat effective in the operation. With that 
decrease, the probability of the BLUE forces accomplishing their mission is lowered.  
 Presence of ERA and Presence of APS 
ERA and APS, as discussed earlier, are meant to be used separately as their 
combined deployment yields no better advantage. Instead, the additional weight of 
having both systems on a platform will again reduce the platform’s mobility, causing the 
BLUE forces to suffer more casualties and having less combat effective units to 
accomplish their mission. 
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(5) Effects of Factors 
As observed in Figure 42. , it can be concluded that the factors Presence of ERA 
and Mobility (%) has the largest degree of effect on improving the Probability of the 
BLUE forces to accomplish their mission, based on their steeper gradient in the 
prediction profiler and the relatively minute value of the t-statistic. 
c. Time Steps Taken to Complete Mission 
Based on Figure 43. the model is deemed to have a good fit with an R
2
 value of 
0.751069. This means that a large proportion of the data points (actual results from the 
simulation) are being accounted for and explained by the predicted model that is used to 
fit the regression line, and the model is accurate in predicting the outcomes of the MOE.  
It also can be observed from Figure 44. that there are seven factors and 
combinations of factors with Prob >|t| smaller than 0.05. This means that there is more 
than 95% confidence that the factors or combinations of factors are really significant in 











Figure 44.  Effects of the factors and combinations on MOE – Time steps taken to Complete Mission. 
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(1) Beneficial Factors and Combinations 
The following factors are beneficial to the outcome of the MOE: 
 Mobility (%) 
With higher Mobility, the platform will be able to travel faster through the urban 
terrain towards its objective. Based on the mission success conditions defined earlier, the 
faster a BLUE force unit is able to reach the objective, the faster the mission is being 
accomplished. Hence, the increase in mobility would improve the MOE by reducing the 
number of time steps taken for the BLUE forces to accomplish its mission. 
 Presence of ERA and Presence of APS 
ERA and APS are defensive measures that allow the reduction in BLUE forces 
casualties, as discussed in earlier segments. The reduction in casualties means that the 
BLUE forces have more units at its disposal to accomplish the mission. This 
improvement in firepower would allow the BLUE forces to dispatch enemies more 
effectively and efficiently, resulting in less time being taken to capture the objective and 
complete the mission. 
(2) Detrimental Factors and Combinations 
 Force Structure 
With mobility being the key factor, having a heavier force structure with lower 
mobility would cause the BLUE forces to take a longer time in reaching their objective, 
and hence, more time steps are required in the simulation to accomplish the mission. 
 Mobility (%) and Presence of ERA 
Likewise, the presence of ERA with its inherent weight will lower the overall 
mobility of the BLUE forces. This, in turn, will increase the vulnerability of the BLUE 
forces. Having suffered from lower mobility already, the increase in vulnerability of the 
BLUE forces will mean that they have fewer combat effective units in the fight, which 
compounds the effect of having lower mobility, resulting in a longer time needed to 
accomplish the mission. 
 Presence of ERA and APS 
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As explained earlier, the presence of both ERA and APS is detrimental, and the 
weight of both systems will reduce the mobility of the platforms. This would in turn 
result in a longer time taken for the BLUE forces to reach their objective and accomplish 
their mission. 
 Presence of ERA and Force Structure 
The presence of a heavier force structure will no doubt cause a decrease in 
mobility. As discussed earlier, the decrease in mobility will reduce the combat 
effectiveness of the BLUE forces by causing these forces to incur more casualties. This 
will in turn compound the undesired effect of requiring more time steps for the BLUE 
forces to reach their objective and accomplish the mission. 
(3) Effects of Factors 
As observed in Figure 44. , it can be concluded that the factors Mobility (%) and 
the Presence of ERA have the largest degree of effect on improving the time taken for the 
BLUE forces to accomplish the mission, based on their steeper gradient in the prediction 
profiler and the relatively minute value of the t-statistic. 
A summary of the effects of the factors and the various combinations of factors on 








Table 8.   Summary of the effect of the factors and various factors combinations on the MOEs (Green = Beneficial, Red = 
Detrimental, Black = N/A). 
% BLUE Casualties FER
Prob of Completing 
Mission
Time Steps taken to 
Complete Mission
Armor Thickness (%) Largest Effect on MOE
Presence of APS
Presence of ERA Largest Effect on MOE Largest Effect on MOE Largest Effect on MOE Largest Effect on MOE
Mobility (%) Largest Effect on MOE Largest Effect on MOE
Force Structure Largest Effect on MOE
Armor Thickness 
Armor Thickness (%) * Mobility (%)
Presence of APS * Presence of ERA
Mobility (%) * Presence of ERA
Mobility (%) * Force Structure
Presence of ERA * Force Structure
Armor Thickness (%) * Presence of ERA





2. MOE Equations  
Based on the results of the regression analysis, a rudimentary equation that relates 
the factors can be established for each of the four MOEs. 
MOE #1 - Percentage of BLUE Casualties = -0.3143 × Armor Thickness 
(%) – 0.1791 × Mobility(%) -26.9396 × Presence of ERA – 6.9410 × 
Presence of APS – 1.5312 × Force Structure + 0.62465 × [Armor 
Thickness (%)-120] × (Presence of ERA-0.5) + 0.3534 × [Mobility (%) -
80] × (Presence of ERA-0.5) + 0.06489 × [ Mobility (%)-80] × (Force 
Structure-4.5) + 9.5109 × (Presence of ERA-0.5) × (Presence of APS-0.5) 
+ 2.3325 × (Presence of ERA-0.5) × (Force Structure-4.5) + 92.4468 (4) 
 
MOE #2 - FER = 2.1650 × Armor Thickness (%) + 72.0845 × Presence of 
ERA + 17.5951 × Force Structure + 3.7390 × [Armor Thickness (%)-120] 
× (Presence of ERA-0.5) + 1.1248 × [Armor Thickness (%)-120] × (Force 
Structure-4.5) + 28.3166 × (Presence of ERA-0.5) × (Force Structure-4.5) 
– 337.6536 (5) 
 
MOE #3 - Probability of Completing Mission = 0.001806 × Mobility (%) 
+ 0.06989 × Presence of ERA + 0.03190 × Presence of APS – 0.004373 × 
[Mobility (%)-80] × (Presence of ERA0.5) – 0.06403 × (Presence of 
ERA0.5) × (Presence of APS-0.5) + 0.7569 (6) 
 
MOE #4 - Time Steps taken to Complete Mission = -20.7577 × Mobility 
(%) – 285.3437 × Presence of ERA – 81.3391 × Presence of APS + 
38.1567 × Force Structure + 12.9153 × [Mobility (%)-80] × (Presence of 
ERA-0.5) + 155.9349 × (Presence of ERA-0.5) × (Presence of APS-0.5) + 
32.5535 × (Presence of ERA-0.5) × (Force Structure-4.5) + 3147.9141 (7) 
a. MOE Equation Insights 
The set of MOE equations is useful in providing the ground military commanders 
and planners an indication of the outcome of their land campaign or operations. This is 
achieved by substituting the equivalent numerical values of their military assets into the 
equation to derive a representative number on the outcome of the various MOEs.  
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In addition, it allows the planners and commanders to have an indication on the 
capability required of their assets in order to achieve certain desired levels of the MOEs 
in operations.  
The output of the equations would further aid the military commanders and 
planners in making decisions and recommendations on the justifiability and the return of 
investment on the embarkation of military operations. 
As an illustration on the fidelity of the equations, Equation (4), the equation for 
the MOE #1 – Percentage of BLUE Casualties and the data for design point #55 are being 
used as example. The values for the factors in design point #55 are as follows: 
1. Armor Thickness (%) – 127 
2. Mobility (%) – 98 
3. Presence of ERA – 1 
4. Presence of APS – 1 
5. Force Structure – 5 
6. Output value of MOE #1for design point #55 in simulation is 5.00. 
Upon entering the values of the factors into Equation (4), the derived value for 
MOE #1 is 4.54, which is reasonably close in comparison with the value obtained via 
simulation. This attests to the validity and fidelity of the derived MOE equations.  
3. Partition Tree Analysis for Insights on MOEs 
In addition to the regression analysis, partition tree analysis of the results based on 
the four MOEs was further conducted. The partition tree function of the JMP Pro 10 
software seeks to identify groups of values of the various factors that best predict the 
outcomes of the MOEs. It accomplishes this by recursively forming a decision tree until 
the desired emergence is achieved (SAS Institute 2012). The process is halted when the 
R
2
 value reaches an acceptable level of at least 0.7. 
This effort is intended to make sense of the effects of the factors and identify the 
tipping point of the effects of various factors on the MOEs, which allows military 
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commanders and planners to make more informed decisions. The following analysis 
focuses on the output of the mean of the four listed MOEs. 
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a. Percentage BLUE Casualties Insight 
The partition tree analysis for the MOE, Percentage BLUE Casualties, is illustrated in Figure 45.  
 
Figure 45.  Partition tree analysis of MOE – % BLUE Casualties.
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The main insight gleaned from this analysis is that the presence of ERA is of 
paramount importance in reducing the percentage of casualties for BLUE forces, with a 
difference of 26% fewer casualties when ERA is present. It is also observed that with the 
presence of ERA, there is little impact on the number of casualties sustained regardless of 
whether APS is present. 
(1) Combination 1 – Percentage of BLUE Casualties sustained ≈ Mean of 
2.06 % 
  
Figure 46.  MOE #1 factors of combination of choice – Combination 1 
Combination 1, as illustrated in Figure 46. is the path of choice to improve the 
outcome of MOE #1 and to reduce the expected percentage of BLUE Casualties to be 
sustained as it yields the lowest percentage of casualties. The presence of ERA on the 
ground vehicles played a significant role in keeping the percentage of casualties sustained 
low (approximately 3.25%) compared to when ERA is absent (approximately 29.83%) as 
illustrated in Figure 47.  
 
Figure 47.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #1 with the presence 
and absence of Explosive Reactive Armor.  
In addition, the presence of APS installed on the ground vehicles will augment the 
performance of the ERA, decreasing the percentage of casualties further to approximately 
2.06% as compared to when APS is absent with an approximate casualty rate of 
approximately 4.48% when APS is absent, as illustrated in Figure 48.  
FACTORS DESCRIPTION
Most Important ERA ≥ 1 (Present)
2nd Most Important APS ≥1 (Present)
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However, the disparity between the benefits (identified in this current section of 
the paper) and disadvantages (identified in an earlier section) of having both ERA and 
APS leaves room for further research. 
 
Figure 48.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #1 with the presence 
and absence of Active Protection System. 
The decrease in the expected percentage of casualties sustained can be attributed 
to the defensive characteristics of both the ERA and APS, which improves the 
survivability of the platforms by reducing their susceptibility and vulnerability. 
(2) Combination 2 – Percentage of BLUE Casualties Sustained ≈ Mean of 
17.7% 
In Combination 2, the absence of ERA drastically increases the percentage of the 
casualties sustained to 29.89% as compared to 3.25% in Combination 1 where ERA is 
present.  
In the event of ERA not being installed, it is important to equip the ground 
vehicles with passive armor that is approximately 113% as thick as that of the current 
armor mounted on the vehicles. Doing so will decrease the expected percentage of 
casualties to 24.7%. Failing to do so will increase the expected percentage casualties to 





Figure 49.  Combination 2 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #1 with difference in 
Armor Thickness percentage. 
To further reduce the expected casualties, it is important to have a force structure 
of value 6 (2 MBT platoons and 1 Stryker platoon). This measure will further decrease 
the expected percentage of casualties sustained to 17.7%. A heavier force structure would 
entail platforms with thicker armor and greater firepower, thus reducing the number of 
casualties sustained. A lighter force structure will result in higher casualties of 
approximately 30.68% as illustrated in Figure 50.  
 




b. Force Exchange Ratio (FER) Insights 
The partition tree analysis for the MOE, Force Exchange Ratio, is illustrated in Figure 51.  
 
Figure 51.  Partition tree analysis of MOE – FER.
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The main insight gained from the partition tree analysis for FER is that having the 
heaviest force structure available, Pure MBT platoons, with armor thickness level of 
more than 126% of the original level, will drastically increase the FER for the BLUE 
force. It must be reiterated that for this particular MOE of FER, the higher the value of 
the mean, the more desired the outcome. 
The combined defensive effects of the factors will improve the survivability of the 
platforms, thus allowing more platforms to participate in the combat longer and inflict 
more damage on the enemy, which accounts for the improvement in FER. 
(1) Combination 1 – FER ≈ Mean of 483.9% 
  
Figure 52.  MOE #2 factors of combination of choice – Combination 1. 
Combination 1, as illustrated in Figure 52. is again the path of choice to improve 
the Force Exchange Ratio (FER) of the Armored Company Team. To do so, it is of 
paramount importance to have the heaviest Force Structure of value 8 (3 M1A2 MBT 
Platoons). This will result in an expected FER of approximately 243% as illustrated in 
Figure 53. The heavy force structure with thicker armor and greater firepower will allow 
the platforms to better survive in a combat environment. Hence, more vehicles and their 
firepower can be brought to bear on the enemy for a longer period of time, thus 
increasing the number of enemy casualties inflicted and improving the FER. 
 
Figure 53.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #2 with the difference 
in Force Structure. 
FACTORS DESCRIPTION
Most Important FS ≥ 8
2nd Most Important Armor Thickness ≥ 126
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In addition, equipping the ground platforms with passive armor that is 
approximately 126% as thick as that of the current armor mounted on the armored vehicle 
will further bolster the FER outcome to approximately 484% as illustrated in Figure 54.  
 
Figure 54.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #2 with the difference 
in Armor Thickness percentage. 
(2) Combination 2 – FER ≈ Mean of 126.24% 
For any force structure configuration that is lighter than value 8, the expected 
FER dwindles to approximately 17.16% as illustrated in Figure 53. Hence, the presence 
of ERA is paramount in improving the FER, resulting in the FER increasing to 
approximately 31.06%. The concurrent deployment of the APS will augment the effect of 
the ERA and further improve the FER to approximately 49.3% as shown in Figure 55.  
 
Figure 55.  Combination 2 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #2 with the presence 
and absence of Explosive Reactive Armor and Active Protection System. 
Furthermore, to improve the FER to approximately 126.24%, the mobility of the 
platforms must be maintained at a minimum of 93% of its original capacity after the 
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installation of ERA and APS. Failing to do so will render the FER to decrease to 
approximately 35.06% as illustrated in Figure 56.  
 
Figure 56.  Combination 2 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #2 with the difference 
in Mobility percentage. 
This is important as mobility is perceived as a passive defensive measure as 
discussed previously. Having a high mobility would improve the survivability of the 
platforms by improving their susceptibility as it is increasingly difficult for the enemy to 
track, engage, and hit the faster moving platforms. This, in turn, allows more vehicles and 




c. Probability of Completing Mission Insights 
The partition tree analysis for the MOE, Probability of Completing Mission, is illustrated in Figure 57.  
 
Figure 57.  Partition tree analysis of MOE – Probability of Completing Mission.
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The main insight gained from the partition tree analysis for the MOE #3, 
Probability of Completing Mission, is that having the presence of ERA is of utmost 
importance in determining the outcome of the MOE. Again, the larger the numerical 
value of the MOE output, the better. 
The combined defensive effects of the factors will improve the survivability of the 
platforms, allowing more platforms to remain in combat longer and inflicting more 
damage on the enemy, which will improve the probability of the BLUE forces 
completing their mission. 
(1) Combination 1 – Probability of Completing Mission ≈ Mean of 0.999 
Combination 1, as illustrated in Figure 58. is the path of choice in maximizing the 
outcome of this MOE. As observed, having the presence of the ERA installed on ground 
platforms is important to the outcome of the MOE, achieving a probability of 
approximately 0.987. 
  
Figure 58.  MOE #3 factors of combination of choice – Combination 1. 
The absence of ERA will decrease the outcome of the MOE to approximately 
0.914 as illustrated in Figure 59. The defensive attributes of the ERA will improve the 
survivability of the platforms in a combat environment, giving the platforms more 
opportunities to complete its mission. 
 
Figure 59.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #3 with the presence 
and absence of Explosive Reactive Armor. 
FACTORS DESCRIPTION
Most Important ERA ≥ 1 (Present)
2nd Most Important FS < 5
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Having a lighter force structure of a value less than 5 (1 MBT platoon and 2 
Bradley platoons), will counterintuitively improve the probability of the BLUE forces 
completing their mission, and the probability achieved is 0.999 as compared to the 
heavier force structure, which gives the outcome of the MOE at approximately 0.975. 
These observations are illustrated in Figure 60. This is attributed to the fact that one of 
the criteria of mission success is defined as the capture of the two land links over the 
river so as to isolate and cut off the enemy defending the objective, catalyzing the 
collapse of the defenses.  
 
Figure 60.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #3 with the difference 
in Force Structure. 
The lighter force structure, along with better mobility, will allow more platforms 
to reach the land links faster. In addition, the defensive attributes accorded to the 
platforms by having a lighter force structure with better mobility, as discussed previously, 
will improve the survivability of the platforms as it renders the enemy more inept at 
targeting, engaging, and hitting the vehicles. This allows more vehicles and their 
associated combat power to remain in the battle and improves the probability of them 
achieving their mission. 
(2) Combination 2 – Probability of Completing Mission ≈ Mean of 0.99 
The absence of ERA will lower the probability of the BLUE forces completing 
their mission to approximately 0.914 due to the lack of the defensive attributes afforded 
by the ERA. Task organizing the Armored Company Team with a lighter force structure 
of less than value 4 (3 Bradley Platoons) will increase the outcome of the MOE to 
approximately 0.96 as illustrated in Figure 61. Figure 61. The benefits and effects of 




Figure 61.  Combination 2 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #3 with the difference 
in Force Structure. 
In addition, equipping the ground platforms with passive armor that is 
approximately 116% as thick as that of the current armor mounted on vehicles will 
further improve the probability of the Armored Company Team achieving the mission to 
approximately 0.99 as illustrated in Figure 62. The attributes and benefits of having 
thicker armor are discussed in previous sections.  
 
 
Figure 62.  Combination 2 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #3 with the difference 
in Armor Thickness percentage. 
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d. Time Steps Taken to Complete Mission Insights 
The partition tree analysis for the MOE, Time Steps taken to Complete Mission, is illustrated in Figure 63.  
 
Figure 63.  Partition tree analysis of MOE – Time steps taken to Complete Mission.
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The main insight gleaned from this partition tree analysis is that Mobility is the 
paramount factor in reducing the time required to complete a mission. Having a mobility 
level of at least 78% of a platform’s original mobility, the time required to complete a 
mission would be reduced significantly by approximately 465 time steps, which is almost 
equivalent to a 25% reduction in mission length. For this MOE, the lower the numerical 
value of the outcome, the better it is. 
(1) Combination 1 – Time Steps taken to Complete Mission ≈ Mean of 967 
For Combination 1, as illustrated in Figure 64. the combination of choice, having 
a mobility of at least 78% of the original value of the platform, will yield an approximate 
time steps required to complete mission of 1,271. 
  
Figure 64.  MOE #4 factors of combination of choice – Combination 1 
Failing that, the approximate time steps required would increase to approximately 
1,736 as illustrated in Figure 65. Figure 65. The benefit of having high mobility is 
apparent where the platforms are able to reach and capture the two land links over the 
river at the western edge of the objective, which constitutes mission success.  
 
Figure 65.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #4 with the difference 
in Mobility percentage. 
FACTORS DESCRIPTION
Most Important Mobility ≥ 78
2nd Most Important FS < 4
3rd Most Important ERA ≥ 1 (Present)




Having a lighter force structure of less than value 4 (3 Bradley Platoons) will 
further reduce the time steps taken to approximately 1,123 as observed in Figure 66. The 
benefits of having a light force structure were discussed in the previous sections. 
 
Figure 66.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #4 with the difference 
in Force Structure. 
Having ERA installed in the platforms will improve the time taken to 
approximately 1,025 and not having ERA installed will increase the time taken to 
approximately 1,244 time steps as observed in Figure 67. This is attributed to the 
improved survivability of the platforms due to the presence of the defensive attributes 
provided by the ERA. More platforms are able to remain in combat and bring their 
firepower to bear on the enemy. Hence, the increase in the number of BLUE combatants 
and their firepower will increase the probability of the BLUE forces capturing the land 
links or annihilating the enemy defenders, which is another measure of mission success. 
 
Figure 67.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #4 with the presence 
and absence of Explosive Reactive Armor. 
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Finally, it can be observed in Figure 68. Figure 68. that having a mobility that is 
equal to or more than 90% of the platform’s original value will improve the time taken 
for the BLUE forces to complete their mission to approximately 967 time steps. 
 
Figure 68.  Combination 1 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #4 with the difference 
in Mobility percentage. 
(2) Combination 2 – Time Steps taken to Complete Mission ≈ Mean of 1492 
For Combination 2, having mobility of less than 78% of the platform’s original 
value is very detrimental to the outcome of the MOE. This results in the BLUE forces 
requiring approximately 1,736 time steps to complete the mission, which is much longer 
than that of Combination 1 (1,271 time steps).  
Having ERA installed in the platforms will improve the outcome of the number of 
time steps taken to complete mission marginally to approximately 1,492 steps as 
illustrated in Figure 69. The benefits of having ERA were discussed in the preceding 
section. However, with mobility, nothing further can be done to improve the time steps 
taken to complete the mission. This is attributed to the fact that platforms with lower 
mobility have less passive defense, and are more likely to be targeted, engaged, and hit 
by the enemy, rendering the BLUE forces with less combat power in the battle, resulting 




Figure 69.  Combination 2 – Comparison of outcome of MOE #4 with the presence 
and absence of Explosive Reactive Armor. 
e. Insights Summary 
The insights gleaned from and the importance of the various factors for the four 
respective MOEs are summarized in Table 9.  This serves to provide a quick visual guide 
and reference for military commanders and planners on the investment of their resources, 
as well as the expected outcomes of any military operations.  
It can be concluded that different MOEs would have a correspondingly different 
set and hierarchy of factors that are important to their outcome. Hence, the military 
commander and planner must be prudent and cognizant of the factors and MOEs that they 
are interested in. 
For example, when the military commander is focused on the expected casualties 
that will be sustained in a combat operation, the most important factor to allocate 
resources to in order to reduce the number of casualties would be the installation of ERA 
on the ground platforms involved. After which, the next important area to invest 
resources in would be the installation of APS on all the ground platforms. 
The allocation of resources to improve the outcome of the respective MOEs of 
interest can be ascertained likewise.  
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The inadequacy of traditional passive armor alone to improve survivability for 
armored vehicles, which indirectly leads to the inability of the armored force to 
accomplish its mission, is getting more and more evident, especially with the rapid 
evolution of threats and the mission sets required of the Armored Company Team, such 
as an offensive operation to capture an urban objective.  
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
At the conclusion of the study, the following research questions that focused and 
directed the study were adequately addressed.  
1. What are the primary design factors for a ground combat vehicle in order 
to achieve mission success and survivability in offensive operations in an 
urban environment? 
As evidenced in the study, a myriad of asymmetric means to improve the 
survivability of the ground platforms in an urban environment were explored and the 
factors that are important were determined through this study. It is recommended for 
future military planners to invest resources into improving these attributes of an armored 
vehicle. The factors are: 
 Passive Armor Thickness Percentage 
 Presence of Explosive Reactive Armor 
 Presence of Active Protection System 
 Mobility Percentage 
 Force Structure 
2. How does the tradeoff of one parameter affect the platform’s 
survivability and performance as a whole?  
The tradeoff of design parameters and the corresponding effects on the platform’s 
survivability are determined from the study. The armor thickness and the presence of 
ERA on the armored vehicle have the largest effect on the number of casualties sustained 
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by the BLUE forces. When the force exchange ratio is of concern, the factors that have 
the largest effect are the armor thickness of the armored vehicle and the force structure of 
the armored company team. 
In addition, the presence of ERA on the armored vehicle and the mobility of the 
armored vehicle have the largest impact on the probability of the BLUE forces 
completing its mission and the time taken for the BLUE forces to accomplish their 
mission. 
3. What is the relative importance of attributes on the platform? 
The importance of attributes is different based on the MOE of interest listed for 
the following MOEs: 
 Percentage of BLUE Casualties 
In order of descending priority, the important attributes are having the presence of 
ERA and APS installed. 
 Force Exchange Ratio 
In order of descending priority, the important attributes are having the force 
structure of three MBT platoons and having an armor thickness of at least 126% for each 
platform. 
 Probability of Completing Mission 
In order of descending priority, the important attributes are having the presence of 
ERA and having a force structure that is heavier than the force structure of one MBT 
platoon and two Bradley platoons. 
 Time Steps taken to Complete Mission 
In order of descending priority, the important attributes are having a mobility of 
more than 70%, a force structure than is equivalent or heavier than three Bradley 
platoons, having ERA installed on all platforms and having a mobility of more than 90%. 
Leveraging on the analysis of the simulation results, equations based on 
regression models from the simulation were obtained for the identified MOEs.  
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The benefits of the MOE equations lie in the fact that they allow the military 
commanders and planners to have some insight into the outcome of any military 
operations that they are required to undertake. In addition, the equations may help them 
to prioritize and invest resources in order to achieve certain levels of desired outcomes in 
any MOEs. 
Upon more in-depth analysis, a partition tree was created using the results for the 
factors where their relative importance and respective threshold values were determined. 
These findings are important as they allow the military planners and commanders to 
prioritize their limited resources according to the factor of paramount importance when 
addressing the respective MOEs. In layman terms, it is a comprehensive guide for 
military commanders on the allocation of their resources. 
In addition, these findings will be of long-term influence in the armored vehicle 
community where the design of the next-generation armored vehicles will take place. 
They will provide insight and guidance to the designers on areas and factors to focus on 
while designing the vehicles and platforms for survivability. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
This study, though extensive, is by no means complete. It is the opinion and 
recommendation of the author that the following areas would require further research and 
study. 
(1) Survivability of Armored Vehicles in Different Environments and 
Operations 
As this study focused solely on the offensive operations of an Armored Company 
Team in an urban environment, there is much scope for the further research and 
exploration of different sized forces of armored platforms performing other operations, 





(2) More Intensive Research 
The space filling property of the NOLH was being leveraged in this study. It is 
opined that a full factorial design can be performed to generate a larger and more 
extensive number of sets of design points. This will serve to further refine and validate 
the findings in this paper. 
In addition, the simulation software of choice in this research was MANA. 
Further research can be done using established combat simulation software, such as 
COMBAT XXI, to further research and validate the presented findings. 
(3) The Effect and Interaction of Armor Thickness with Presence of ERA and 
Presence of ERA with Presence of APS 
The author highlighted in earlier chapters that there was a contradiction in the 
observed results from the interaction of these factors: Armor Thickness Percentage with 
the Presence of ERA and the Presence of ERA with Presence of APS. Hence, more 
research and study would be required to establish the interactions and effects of the two 
factors on the respective MOEs. 
(4) Using Actual Values for Simulations 
As this research is unclassified, much of the values used as inputs in the 
simulations, such as Armor Thickness and Armor Penetration Capability of the 
platform’s weapons, are derived from open sources which are likely to deviate from the 
true value. Hence, more accurate and realistic results can be obtained if the actual values 
of the platforms’ various attributes can be used for further research. 
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APPENDIX A. MODEL PARAMETERS 
Table 10 illustrates the values used for the units’ attributes in the MANA simulation. 


















Main Gun 120 27 4,000 950 150 15 2,500 750 150 10
Co-Axial
MG
7.62 2,000 1,200 10 1 - - - - - - -
Comd MG 0.5 Cal 1,000 1,200 20 1 - - - - - - -
Main Gun 125 25 4,000 800 150 15 2,500 600 150 10
Co-Axial
MG
7.62 2,000 1,200 10 1 - - - - - - -
Comd MG 7.62 1,000 1,200 10 1 - - - - - - -
Canon 25 300 2,500 25 10 900 2,200 10 10 1,000
TOW - - - - - - 4 3,750 900 135 5
MG 7.62 2,200 1,200 10 1 - - - - - - -
Canon 30 500 2,500 25 20 - - - - - - -
MG 7.62 2,200 1,200 10 1 - - - - - - -
HMG 12.7 2,200 2,000 20 4 - - - - - - 1,000
40mm AGL 40 - - - - - 462 1,400 0 0 300
Technical 5 50 Cal 1 1.5 20 60 - - 0 1 HMG 12.7 300 2,000 20 4 - - - - - 1,000 - 3,000 3,000 180
Technical 5 ATGM 1 1.5 20 60 - - 0 1 MILAN - - - - - - 2 3,000 1,050 160 - 4,000 3,500 90
Technical 5 RPG-29 1 1.5 20 60 - - 0 1 RPG-29 105 - - - - 500 850 200 - 3,000 3,000 180
En Troops 4 50 Cal 1 - 2 4 - - 0 1 HMG 12.7 300 2,000 20 4 - - - - - 1,000 - 3,000 3,000 180
En Troops 4 ATGM 1 - 2 4 - - 0 1 MILAN - - - - - - 2 3,000 1,050 160 - 4,000 3,500 90
En Troops 4 RPG-29 1 - 2 4 - - 0 RPG-29 105 - - - - 2 500 850 200 3 - 3,000 3,000 180




1 - - 56 - - 0 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 180 10,000 10,000 360
Hellfire - - - - - - 8 8,000 1,200 120 - 10
Hydra 70 - - - - - 38 8,000 500 100 - 10
Canon 30 1,200 1,500 20 20 - - - - - - 1,000






















































70 25 42 960
47 20 43


























2 50 4,000 2,500 15
60 5,000 2,500 25




37 62 250 350
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APPENDIX B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
This section tabulates the design points generated for both the initial and refined simulations with their corresponding results. 
A. INITIAL SIMULATION DESIGN POINTS GENERATED USING MINITAB AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
Table 12.  Table 13.  Table 14.  and Table 14.  tabulates the results for the respective MOEs for each design point. 











(Yes - Increase No. 
































1 140 No No 100 Yes No Pure MBT 0.1 0.042857 0.008333333 25.44 0.399142 0.003931 0.86 0.04957 1406.22 9.371746
2 140 No No 100 No No Pure MBT 0.2 0.063888 0.016666667 25.54 0.398169 0.007831 0.86 0.04957 1413.52 9.68998
3 100 No No 60 Yes No Pure MBT 7.16 0.333638 0.596666667 21.62 0.535202 0.331175 0.68 0.066639 2709.7 32.70527
4 100 No No 100 Yes No Pure MBT 5.88 0.315116 0.49 22.88 0.510014 0.256993 0.9 0.042857 1589.6 60.65591
5 100 No No 100 No No Pure MBT 5.94 0.310904 0.495 22.68 0.565281 0.261905 0.92 0.038756 1569.62 53.17319
6 140 No No 60 No No Pure MBT 0.26 0.068868 0.021666667 26.6 0.354562 0.009774 0.82 0.054884 2403.16 21.55182
7 140 No No 60 Yes No Pure MBT 0.22 0.065714 0.018333333 26.3 0.370603 0.008365 0.86 0.04957 2447.1 20.86321
8 100 No No 60 No No Pure MBT 7.44 0.322186 0.62 21.52 0.587794 0.345725 0.56 0.070912 2706.6 37.56202
9 140 No Yes 100 Yes No Pure MBT 0 0 0 25.34 0.366573 0 0.96 0.027994 1417.82 10.29681
10 140 No Yes 60 Yes No Pure MBT 0 0 0 26.2 0.379043 0 0.86 0.04957 2429.4 18.07779
11 140 No Yes 100 No No Pure MBT 0 0 0 25.04 0.414985 0 0.9 0.042857 1410.88 8.954335
12 100 No Yes 60 No No Pure MBT 3.16 0.381576 0.263333333 24.56 0.501557 0.128664 0.8 0.057143 2547.96 30.26791
13 100 No Yes 100 No No Pure MBT 1.36 0.231693 0.113333333 24.5 0.411319 0.05551 0.98 0.02 1439 8.772824
14 100 No Yes 100 Yes No Pure MBT 1.18 0.205416 0.098333333 24.92 0.371253 0.047352 1 0 1447.34 9.423402
15 140 No Yes 60 No No Pure MBT 0 0 0 25.7 0.416251 0 0.88 0.046423 2428.12 16.48385
16 100 No Yes 60 Yes No Pure MBT 2.68 0.35044 0.223333333 25.88 0.43013 0.103555 0.78 0.059178 2440.44 26.95039
17 140 No No 60 No Yes Pure MBT 0.2 0.075593 0.016666667 25.82 0.347222 0.007746 0.86 0.04957 2438.9 19.36994
18 140 No No 100 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0.2 0.057143 0.016666667 25.16 0.383709 0.007949 0.94 0.033927 1413.2 8.410149
19 100 No No 100 Yes Yes Pure MBT 6.14 0.355723 0.511666667 22.5 0.546043 0.272889 0.84 0.052372 1714.98 79.69816
20 140 No No 100 No Yes Pure MBT 0.22 0.065714 0.018333333 25.34 0.385036 0.008682 0.94 0.033927 1414.46 9.509961
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21 100 No No 60 Yes Yes Pure MBT 7.06 0.290545 0.588333333 22.14 0.675525 0.31888 0.64 0.068571 2682.34 35.91209
22 140 No No 60 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0.3 0.076931 0.025 25.98 0.36866 0.011547 0.9 0.042857 2454.2 15.807
23 100 No No 100 No Yes Pure MBT 6.44 0.332167 0.536666667 21.42 0.610848 0.300654 0.82 0.054884 1658.88 72.14243
24 100 No No 60 No Yes Pure MBT 7.36 0.320408 0.613333333 21.06 0.66909 0.349478 0.6 0.069985 2738.48 35.41086
25 100 No Yes 60 No Yes Pure MBT 3.62 0.410962 0.301666667 25.04 0.48652 0.144569 0.78 0.059178 2514.2 32.30832
26 140 No Yes 60 No Yes Pure MBT 0 0 0 25.94 0.398374 0 0.88 0.046423 2411.72 21.52229
27 140 No Yes 100 No Yes Pure MBT 0 0 0 24.88 0.379731 0 0.96 0.027994 1432.44 9.680283
28 100 No Yes 100 Yes Yes Pure MBT 1.06 0.208806 0.088333333 25.18 0.394544 0.042097 0.92 0.038756 1429.12 8.027231
29 140 No Yes 60 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0 0 0 25.9 0.407331 0 0.9 0.042857 2409 21.57292
30 100 No Yes 60 Yes Yes Pure MBT 2.54 0.334676 0.211666667 25.24 0.396474 0.100634 0.9 0.042857 2541.16 23.32159
31 100 No Yes 100 No Yes Pure MBT 1.08 0.189177 0.09 24.68 0.413487 0.04376 0.96 0.027994 1427.04 11.21828
32 140 No Yes 100 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0 0 0 25.02 0.403546 0 0.98 0.02 1416.78 7.56222
33 100 Yes No 60 No No Pure MBT 5.76 0.28365 0.48 22.62 0.57845 0.254642 0.82 0.054884 2579.06 30.08607
34 140 Yes No 100 Yes No Pure MBT 0.04 0.027994 0.003333333 25.68 0.36971 0.001558 0.94 0.033927 1439.68 7.828594
35 140 Yes No 100 No No Pure MBT 0.08 0.038756 0.006666667 25.26 0.440603 0.003167 0.92 0.038756 1443.6 7.477422
36 140 Yes No 60 No No Pure MBT 0.12 0.054511 0.01 26.12 0.421504 0.004594 0.84 0.052372 2444.32 19.80926
37 100 Yes No 100 No No Pure MBT 5.08 0.361222 0.423333333 22.92 0.5189 0.22164 0.9 0.042857 1600.12 59.99059
38 100 Yes No 100 Yes No Pure MBT 4.94 0.308267 0.411666667 23.38 0.481401 0.211292 0.94 0.033927 1540.82 44.47007
39 140 Yes No 60 Yes No Pure MBT 0.14 0.063952 0.011666667 25.7 0.424985 0.005447 0.9 0.042857 2468.56 18.50651
40 100 Yes No 60 Yes No Pure MBT 5.68 0.340995 0.473333333 22.42 0.630575 0.253345 0.58 0.070508 2642.24 39.08436
41 140 Yes Yes 100 No No Pure MBT 0 0 0 21.78 0.474053 0 1 0 1216.88 9.412482
42 140 Yes Yes 60 No No Pure MBT 0 0 0 24.26 0.400826 0 0.98 0.02 2158.76 29.03342
43 100 Yes Yes 60 No No Pure MBT 0.78 0.118804 0.065 23 0.432364 0.033913 1 0 2143.66 21.79001
44 140 Yes Yes 100 Yes No Pure MBT 0 0 0 23.54 0.432562 0 0.98 0.02 1250.82 10.28336
45 100 Yes Yes 100 No No Pure MBT 0.2 0.075593 0.016666667 22.14 0.472086 0.009033 0.98 0.02 1236.38 10.45374
46 100 Yes Yes 100 Yes No Pure MBT 0.12 0.046423 0.01 22.92 0.504543 0.005236 0.98 0.02 1256.88 9.652266
47 140 Yes Yes 60 Yes No Pure MBT 0 0 0 23.86 0.419922 0 0.98 0.02 2136 23.20574
48 100 Yes Yes 60 Yes No Pure MBT 0.58 0.151429 0.048333333 25.48 0.425935 0.022763 0.92 0.038756 2181.14 24.92523
49 140 Yes No 60 No Yes Pure MBT 0.32 0.072506 0.026666667 24.46 0.479974 0.013083 0.96 0.027994 2185.76 22.58923
50 140 Yes No 100 No Yes Pure MBT 0.14 0.04957 0.011666667 22.36 0.430244 0.006261 0.98 0.02 1238.62 7.321586
51 140 Yes No 100 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0.06 0.033927 0.005 22.86 0.441713 0.002625 0.96 0.027994 1233.08 8.530897
52 100 Yes No 60 Yes Yes Pure MBT 5.1 0.360555 0.425 23.06 0.538638 0.221162 0.86 0.04957 2390.36 38.32174
53 140 Yes No 60 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0.1 0.042857 0.008333333 24.6 0.486554 0.004065 0.92 0.038756 2177.3 23.80959
54 100 Yes No 60 No Yes Pure MBT 5.3 0.326077 0.441666667 21.68 0.587933 0.244465 0.86 0.04957 2360.76 44.92104
55 100 Yes No 100 No Yes Pure MBT 4.28 0.237401 0.356666667 21.6 0.627271 0.198148 0.94 0.033927 1291.32 12.86373
56 100 Yes No 100 Yes Yes Pure MBT 3.26 0.320472 0.271666667 21.32 0.558014 0.152908 0.96 0.027994 1322.76 50.17358
57 100 Yes Yes 100 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0.2 0.057143 0.016666667 22.74 0.538183 0.008795 0.98 0.02 1238.7 10.37467
58 140 Yes Yes 60 No Yes Pure MBT 0 0 0 24.28 0.432402 0 0.94 0.033927 2134.74 23.42048
59 140 Yes Yes 100 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0 0 0 22.78 0.493459 0 0.96 0.027994 1250.1 8.845395
60 100 Yes Yes 100 No Yes Pure MBT 0.28 0.070218 0.023333333 22.16 0.499273 0.012635 1 0 1234.7 10.09604
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61 100 Yes Yes 60 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0.66 0.129709 0.055 24.82 0.424447 0.026591 0.92 0.038756 2213.06 24.06183
62 100 Yes Yes 60 No Yes Pure MBT 0.74 0.117143 0.061666667 24.26 0.383124 0.030503 0.92 0.038756 2170.66 25.29368
63 140 Yes Yes 100 No Yes Pure MBT 0 0 0 22.8 0.463351 0 0.98 0.02 1241.72 10.37635
64 140 Yes Yes 60 Yes Yes Pure MBT 0 0 0 24.7 0.386771 0 0.96 0.027994 2195.74 23.90932
65 140 No No 60 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 3.62 0.242251 0.362 21.66 0.549293 0.167128 0.68 0.066639 2262.02 81.82124
66 100 No No 100 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 6.32 0.273212 0.632 17.66 0.675284 0.357871 0.82 0.054884 1513.24 101.6306
67 140 No No 100 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 2.94 0.192534 0.294 20.46 0.543766 0.143695 0.98 0.02 1121.42 21.18328
68 100 No No 100 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 5.88 0.272014 0.588 18.58 0.591843 0.316469 0.9 0.042857 1380.4 81.05261
69 140 No No 60 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 3.64 0.224536 0.364 22.1 0.472294 0.164706 0.74 0.062662 2210.1 76.72346
70 140 No No 100 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 3.74 0.180272 0.374 20.44 0.491694 0.182975 1 0 1161.4 22.90033
71 100 No No 60 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 6.46 0.318427 0.646 18.28 0.725647 0.353392 0.52 0.071371 2353.42 91.59878
72 100 No No 60 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 6.42 0.269679 0.642 18.9 0.681086 0.339683 0.54 0.0712 2344.8 89.82637
73 140 No Yes 60 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.64 0.120407 0.064 22.98 0.551429 0.02785 0.92 0.038756 1666.74 28.66365
74 100 No Yes 100 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.64 0.14217 0.064 21.44 0.526955 0.029851 0.98 0.02 1026.36 18.39716
75 140 No Yes 100 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.28 0.075809 0.028 20.88 0.50276 0.01341 1 0 970.68 11.12524
76 140 No Yes 60 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.7 0.134771 0.07 20.98 0.524105 0.033365 0.96 0.027994 1632.26 36.93647
77 100 No Yes 60 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 1.02 0.17021 0.102 21.86 0.533766 0.046661 0.98 0.02 1613.22 26.45667
78 100 No Yes 100 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.66 0.126523 0.066 20.68 0.475901 0.031915 1 0 1001.52 13.57541
79 140 No Yes 100 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.32 0.092317 0.032 21.4 0.518239 0.014953 0.98 0.02 1006.76 14.07443
80 100 No Yes 60 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.76 0.141594 0.076 22.12 0.405714 0.034358 0.98 0.02 1626.32 37.09008
81 100 No No 60 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 6.08 0.296703 0.608 17.54 0.613594 0.346636 0.64 0.068571 2205.84 89.433
82 100 No No 60 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 6.2 0.27701 0.62 18.78 0.623545 0.330138 0.5 0.071429 2369.02 92.10178
83 140 No No 100 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 2.96 0.211814 0.296 21.86 0.589022 0.135407 0.96 0.027994 1190.64 41.65915
84 100 No No 100 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 5.42 0.263555 0.542 18.06 0.579521 0.300111 0.92 0.038756 1280.66 75.22752
85 140 No No 60 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 3.64 0.189004 0.364 21.66 0.566125 0.168052 0.68 0.066639 2279.86 82.51574
86 140 No No 60 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 3.38 0.24393 0.338 21.74 0.421668 0.155474 0.74 0.062662 2168.12 85.90246
87 100 No No 100 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 5.12 0.280873 0.512 18.68 0.627558 0.27409 0.88 0.046423 1328.76 90.07126
88 140 No No 100 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 2.9 0.183503 0.29 20.88 0.457714 0.138889 1 0 1134.96 32.15967
89 140 No Yes 100 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.38 0.09852 0.038 21.12 0.550058 0.017992 0.98 0.02 1031.54 15.20428
90 100 No Yes 100 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.66 0.123255 0.066 20.52 0.485075 0.032164 1 0 1001.34 12.65329
91 140 No Yes 60 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.78 0.162355 0.078 21.78 0.473192 0.035813 0.96 0.027994 1624.52 40.58705
92 140 No Yes 60 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.76 0.135707 0.076 21.8 0.480646 0.034862 0.96 0.027994 1658.78 34.78181
93 100 No Yes 60 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.92 0.142399 0.092 21.74 0.444293 0.042318 1 0 1593.16 21.86378
94 100 No Yes 60 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.78 0.140814 0.078 21.62 0.478851 0.036078 1 0 1625.58 24.5271
95 140 No Yes 100 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.32 0.087785 0.032 24.72 0.406117 0.012945 0.94 0.033927 1224.16 9.965056
96 100 No Yes 100 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.9 0.174379 0.09 24.5 0.486764 0.036735 0.94 0.033927 1209.08 11.36966
97 100 Yes No 100 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 4.02 0.283549 0.402 21.06 0.549144 0.190883 0.98 0.02 1314.72 40.9693
98 140 Yes No 60 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 2.06 0.200835 0.206 22.28 0.522193 0.09246 0.94 0.033927 1889.84 72.28239
99 100 Yes No 60 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 4.46 0.280248 0.446 20.34 0.512385 0.219272 0.88 0.046423 1849.72 67.52165
100 140 Yes No 60 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 1.9 0.192195 0.19 21.96 0.540567 0.086521 0.88 0.046423 1831.68 62.79948
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101 100 Yes No 60 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 4.86 0.315595 0.486 20.76 0.691381 0.234104 0.76 0.061012 1982.88 74.41227
102 100 Yes No 100 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 4.08 0.32051 0.408 18.88 0.552279 0.216102 0.94 0.033927 1206.82 68.47891
103 140 Yes No 100 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 2 0.189521 0.2 21.48 0.612949 0.09311 0.96 0.027994 1082.86 28.72009
104 140 Yes No 100 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 1.78 0.167308 0.178 20.18 0.483769 0.088206 1 0 1045.72 15.71761
105 140 Yes Yes 60 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.12 0.054511 0.012 22.04 0.411032 0.005445 1 0 1586.48 23.15319
106 100 Yes Yes 100 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.12 0.054511 0.012 20.36 0.436835 0.005894 1 0 981.5 10.77519
107 140 Yes Yes 100 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.06 0.044355 0.006 20.96 0.540567 0.002863 0.98 0.02 1004.1 14.96718
108 140 Yes Yes 60 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.16 0.072054 0.016 21.72 0.416046 0.007366 0.96 0.027994 1608.94 46.11947
109 140 Yes Yes 100 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.06 0.044355 0.006 20.26 0.505327 0.002962 1 0 991.24 14.1423
110 100 Yes Yes 60 Yes No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.2 0.063888 0.02 21.94 0.430861 0.009116 1 0 1591.18 35.13229
111 100 Yes Yes 100 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.16 0.052372 0.016 21.28 0.502272 0.007519 1 0 1013.22 13.84849
112 100 Yes Yes 60 No No Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.34 0.083837 0.034 21.86 0.532234 0.015554 0.96 0.027994 1606.58 24.9897
113 100 Yes No 60 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 4.32 0.268693 0.432 20.62 0.545026 0.209505 0.84 0.052372 1838.64 72.59878
114 100 Yes No 100 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 3.08 0.264714 0.308 19.76 0.501882 0.15587 0.98 0.02 1111.12 42.78016
115 140 Yes No 60 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 2.4 0.197949 0.24 22.74 0.607981 0.105541 0.86 0.04957 1928.8 68.45458
116 140 Yes No 100 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 1.82 0.144815 0.182 21.48 0.518428 0.08473 1 0 1049.42 18.4968
117 140 Yes No 60 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 2.24 0.179705 0.224 21.84 0.478399 0.102564 0.92 0.038756 1837.2 60.86262
118 100 Yes No 60 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 4.14 0.272569 0.414 19.8 0.538327 0.209091 0.84 0.052372 1865.12 74.58502
119 100 Yes No 100 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 4.2 0.235606 0.42 18.84 0.520878 0.22293 0.96 0.027994 1161.58 56.51317
120 140 Yes No 100 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 1.84 0.181513 0.184 20.6 0.478944 0.08932 1 0 1091.7 28.05626
121 100 Yes Yes 60 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.4 0.085714 0.04 21.72 0.509534 0.018416 0.96 0.027994 1573.04 19.4426
122 100 Yes Yes 100 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.34 0.078818 0.034 21.06 0.53712 0.016144 0.98 0.02 1007.08 15.48155
123 100 Yes Yes 100 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.14 0.04957 0.014 20.56 0.508828 0.006809 0.98 0.02 988.72 13.99895
124 140 Yes Yes 60 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.12 0.046423 0.012 22.38 0.445284 0.005362 0.98 0.02 1601.6 21.79742
125 140 Yes Yes 100 Yes Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.08 0.038756 0.008 20.8 0.58554 0.003846 0.96 0.027994 970.4 10.88556
126 140 Yes Yes 100 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.02 0.02 0.002 20.72 0.545886 0.000965 1 0 967.98 9.867055
127 100 Yes Yes 60 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.46 0.099837 0.046 21.84 0.553549 0.021062 0.96 0.027994 1608.12 24.27858
128 140 Yes Yes 60 No Yes Stryker + 1 MBT Platoon 0.16 0.052372 0.016 21.66 0.476047 0.007387 1 0 1601.68 33.38343
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B. REFINED SIMULATION DESIGN POINTS GENERATED USING NOLH MINITAB AND SIMULATION 
RESULTS 
Table 16.  Table 17.  Table 18.  Table 19.  and Table 19.  tabulates the results for the respective MOEs for each design point. 
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1 137 70 0 0 8 0.38 0.089852 3.167 23.88 0.408721 58.244 18.393 0.98 0.02 1794.42 16.18917
2 102 79 0 0 8 5.48 0.334713 45.667 21.42 0.624722 52.244 1.144 0.94 0.033927 1831.54 50.7995
3 116 90 0 0 8 2.36 0.193275 19.667 22.22 0.666572 54.195 2.756 0.9 0.042857 1385.26 10.78865
4 126 75 1 0 8 0.02 0.02 0.167 23.36 0.479592 56.976 341.854 0.98 0.02 1672.68 16.58545
5 140 75 1 0 8 0.01 0 0.083 23.52 0.453773 57.366 688.390 0.96 0.027994 1681.2 14.41295
6 132 80 1 0 8 0.01 0 0.083 24.22 0.408372 59.073 708.878 0.96 0.027994 1601.7 11.79866
7 114 62 0 1 8 2.92 0.278245 24.333 23.76 0.395443 57.951 2.382 0.94 0.033927 2153.3 29.55463
8 103 82 0 1 8 3.86 0.339279 32.167 23.6 0.526056 57.561 1.789 0.94 0.033927 1658.24 30.84096
9 113 97 0 1 8 1.76 0.184192 14.667 21.68 0.558014 52.878 3.605 1 0 1274.48 10.04964
10 139 90 1 1 8 0.01 0 0.083 22.62 0.504583 55.171 662.049 0.98 0.02 1374.68 10.65164
11 106 63 0 0 7 5 0.27701 45.455 22.4 0.555492 54.634 1.202 0.72 0.064143 2333.66 63.8966
12 128 72 0 0 7 2.98 0.244932 27.091 23.66 0.530391 57.707 2.130 0.9 0.042857 1850.26 38.56746
13 118 76 0 0 7 2.98 0.293452 27.091 23.62 0.475429 57.610 2.127 0.92 0.038756 1771.14 49.36006
14 128 76 0 0 7 1.76 0.229569 16.000 24.32 0.418393 59.317 3.707 0.96 0.027994 1776.72 41.81275
15 134 87 0 0 7 1.72 0.148571 15.636 22.98 0.505876 56.049 3.585 0.98 0.02 1407.4 15.51736
16 107 95 0 0 7 4.38 0.352125 39.818 22.66 0.493724 55.268 1.388 1 0 1438.36 38.97042
17 107 79 1 0 7 0.42 0.086142 3.818 24.02 0.411558 58.585 15.344 0.96 0.027994 1500.4 12.36093
18 125 65 0 1 7 1.44 0.146134 13.091 23.48 0.456464 57.268 4.375 0.94 0.033927 1930.5 20.34332
19 121 67 0 1 7 1.52 0.154497 13.818 23.4 0.416986 57.073 4.130 1 0 1830.28 18.28395




Table 16.   Refined DOE and results – Part 2. 
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21 102 87 0 1 7 3.4 0.233867 30.909 21.58 0.479021 52.634 1.703 1 0 1446.76 18.27204
22 131 92 0 1 7 1.02 0.135496 9.273 22.96 0.441667 56.000 6.039 1 0 1356.46 19.33989
23 123 93 0 1 7 1.24 0.163032 11.273 22.58 0.411161 55.073 4.886 1 0 1345.26 17.29211
24 134 95 0 1 7 1.18 0.141969 10.727 23.84 0.511389 58.146 5.420 0.94 0.033927 1343.56 19.56632
25 137 66 1 1 7 0.06 0.033927 0.545 23.86 0.490739 58.195 106.691 0.98 0.02 1810.68 15.89176
26 104 77 1 1 7 0.24 0.073179 2.182 22.96 0.438885 56.000 25.667 1 0 1524.74 11.05931
27 101 91 1 1 7 0.14 0.057214 1.273 22.84 0.480102 55.707 43.770 0.94 0.033927 1281.94 9.877925
28 135 93 1 1 7 0.04 0.027994 0.364 22.54 0.531621 54.976 151.183 0.94 0.033927 1274.04 10.12755
29 118 60 0 0 6 3.5 0.221774 31.818 20.54 0.405281 50.098 1.574 1 0 1845.66 34.25241
30 123 64 0 0 6 3.12 0.2613 28.364 21.76 0.414591 53.073 1.871 0.98 0.02 1858.82 57.82057
31 123 96 0 0 6 2.66 0.213063 24.182 19.98 0.523325 48.732 2.015 1 0 1109.26 20.24327
32 131 99 0 0 6 2.16 0.181513 19.636 19.26 0.531313 46.976 2.392 1 0 1020.46 12.3426
33 107 71 1 0 6 0.5 0.122057 4.545 20.52 0.412301 50.049 11.011 1 0 1366.42 15.62899
34 109 71 1 0 6 0.26 0.079847 2.364 20.16 0.413408 49.171 20.803 1 0 1345.1 12.64027
35 138 74 1 0 6 0.28 0.081014 2.545 19.2 0.416006 46.829 18.397 1 0 1287.6 11.3154
36 118 88 1 0 6 0.36 0.079591 3.273 19.54 0.449226 47.659 14.562 1 0 1077.02 11.31755
37 108 91 1 0 6 0.36 0.093721 3.273 18.74 0.514928 45.707 13.966 1 0 1062 11.93383
38 120 68 0 1 6 2 0.187355 18.182 17.44 0.629972 42.537 2.340 0.98 0.02 1593.2 42.53283
39 115 74 0 1 6 2.1 0.237762 19.091 18.1 0.439155 44.146 2.312 0.98 0.02 1492 48.93484
40 128 82 0 1 6 1.54 0.151752 14.000 17.64 0.451537 43.024 3.073 1 0 1239.52 22.25229
41 101 89 0 1 6 2.9 0.242857 26.364 17.18 0.476115 41.902 1.589 1 0 1197.54 30.43527
42 121 62 1 1 6 0.08 0.038756 0.727 17.34 0.462125 42.293 58.152 1 0 1555.36 21.0419
43 110 63 1 1 6 0.16 0.052372 1.455 17.88 0.474355 43.610 29.982 1 0 1526.24 22.70337
44 124 78 1 1 6 0.1 0.042857 0.909 17.42 0.508772 42.488 46.737 1 0 1218.16 15.43575
45 108 81 1 1 6 0.12 0.046423 1.091 16.18 0.362182 39.463 36.175 1 0 1154.26 12.8904
46 104 83 1 1 6 0.04 0.04 0.364 16.54 0.370559 40.341 110.939 1 0 1119.34 12.23457
47 121 92 0 0 5 3.5 0.329811 35.000 22.36 0.60593 54.537 1.558 0.9 0.042857 1556.68 63.18201
48 114 96 0 0 5 2.78 0.179091 27.800 22.74 0.477929 55.463 1.995 0.98 0.02 1309.26 15.83499
49 110 99 0 0 5 3.38 0.26169 33.800 21.68 0.551392 52.878 1.564 0.98 0.02 1285.54 36.80467
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51 108 83 1 0 5 0.56 0.131429 5.600 24.48 0.470553 59.707 10.662 0.94 0.033927 1435.7 13.35702
52 137 87 1 0 5 0.66 0.144589 6.600 24.54 0.418169 59.854 9.069 0.92 0.038756 1369.68 10.89667
53 105 94 1 0 5 0.46 0.121923 4.600 23.94 0.496033 58.390 12.694 0.94 0.033927 1267.74 12.72734
54 122 98 1 0 5 0.44 0.111245 4.400 24.12 0.41467 58.829 13.370 0.96 0.027994 1212.06 10.8891
55 127 98 1 0 5 0.5 0.128571 5.000 23.6 0.466861 57.561 11.512 1 0 1215.3 7.738388
56 129 99 1 0 5 0.46 0.107703 4.600 24.14 0.431429 58.878 12.800 0.98 0.02 1189.92 8.072773
57 115 60 0 1 5 2.46 0.19211 24.600 23.7 0.40933 57.805 2.350 0.94 0.033927 2148.94 40.32764
58 129 69 0 1 5 1.78 0.16485 17.800 23.7 0.474879 57.805 3.247 0.96 0.027994 1754.42 19.41035
59 112 72 1 1 5 0.26 0.07456 2.600 24.78 0.462725 60.439 23.246 0.98 0.02 1667.84 16.2371
60 116 73 1 1 5 0.22 0.071657 2.200 24 0.38119 58.537 26.608 0.98 0.02 1631.42 10.62931
61 140 78 1 1 5 0.16 0.072054 1.600 24.16 0.506577 58.927 36.829 0.94 0.033927 1528.52 13.38663
62 120 80 1 1 5 0.16 0.052372 1.600 23.7 0.436358 57.805 36.128 0.98 0.02 1457.76 12.45909
63 130 84 1 1 5 0.1 0.051508 1.000 24.18 0.444182 58.976 58.976 0.96 0.027994 1391.08 10.26434
64 136 86 1 1 5 0.14 0.04957 1.400 24.34 0.394462 59.366 42.404 0.98 0.02 1414.06 14.75491
65 113 94 1 1 5 0.18 0.061875 1.800 24.26 0.401843 59.171 32.873 0.96 0.027994 1268.68 10.38325
66 127 66 0 0 4 4.48 0.164726 49.778 17.26 0.600551 42.098 0.846 0.38 0.069341 2586.32 81.61745
67 104 74 0 0 4 4.68 0.220278 52.000 18.36 0.504478 44.780 0.861 0.54 0.0712 2320.46 92.70334
68 110 76 0 0 4 4.9 0.249489 54.444 17.92 0.541231 43.707 0.803 0.66 0.067673 2163.6 89.38185
69 100 82 0 0 4 4.68 0.273212 52.000 20.14 0.577122 49.122 0.945 0.88 0.046423 1828.9 72.18511
70 124 88 0 0 4 4.72 0.2829 52.444 18.86 0.567134 46.000 0.877 0.72 0.064143 1924.68 101.1142
71 128 88 0 0 4 4.62 0.255375 51.333 18.86 0.471221 46.000 0.896 0.72 0.064143 1949.22 99.86858
72 111 91 1 0 4 0.6 0.12454 6.667 18.42 0.414128 44.927 6.739 1 0 1169.18 11.89055
73 125 100 1 0 4 0.56 0.118356 6.222 19.06 0.432751 46.488 7.471 1 0 1063.42 12.1997
74 111 61 0 1 4 4.34 0.238379 48.222 19.4 0.642698 47.317 0.981 0.8 0.057143 2413.56 61.85394
75 113 62 0 1 4 4.14 0.206051 46.000 20.4 0.515079 49.756 1.082 0.84 0.052372 2374.08 60.74923
76 118 63 0 1 4 3.68 0.220278 40.889 19.16 0.557955 46.732 1.143 0.8 0.057143 2235.74 70.35028
77 135 66 0 1 4 3.9 0.208493 43.333 18.96 0.440741 46.244 1.067 0.64 0.068571 2315.58 80.25963
78 103 73 0 1 4 4.34 0.218735 48.222 20.96 0.50706 51.122 1.060 0.88 0.046423 2088.28 67.42191
79 133 77 0 1 4 3.54 0.230722 39.333 19.46 0.432562 47.463 1.207 0.88 0.046423 1818.74 71.92744




Table 18.   Refined DOE and results – Part 4. 
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81 130 61 1 1 4 0.7 0.115175 7.778 19.58 0.427704 47.756 6.140 1 0 1735.9 16.48112
82 126 64 1 1 4 0.96 0.142743 10.667 19.76 0.46208 48.195 4.518 1 0 1697.92 26.83858
83 119 68 1 1 4 0.48 0.082015 5.333 19.54 0.438187 47.659 8.936 1 0 1550.5 10.22814
84 136 77 0 0 3 3.08 0.278245 30.800 17.08 0.677836 41.659 1.353 0.94 0.033927 1732.38 67.34804
85 132 79 0 0 3 2.32 0.208865 23.200 16.48 0.671422 40.195 1.733 0.98 0.02 1439.38 37.92585
86 116 83 0 0 3 3.3 0.286071 33.000 17.92 0.669962 43.707 1.324 0.98 0.02 1464.06 49.92356
87 130 97 0 0 3 2.24 0.184192 22.400 17.76 0.653131 43.317 1.934 0.98 0.02 1111 24.67048
88 119 98 0 0 3 2.66 0.246792 26.600 17.36 0.517261 42.341 1.592 1 0 1140.44 27.81829
89 139 71 1 0 3 0.28 0.081014 2.800 15.88 0.545587 38.732 13.833 1 0 1354.46 24.54627
90 112 78 1 0 3 0.28 0.075809 2.800 13.98 0.421358 34.098 12.178 1 0 1182.44 18.97184
91 125 86 1 0 3 0.22 0.065714 2.200 14.18 0.444182 34.585 15.721 1 0 1077.42 21.81857
92 120 92 1 0 3 0.36 0.08926 3.600 14.86 0.535293 36.244 10.068 1 0 1015.64 23.52239
93 132 69 0 1 3 1.4 0.148461 14.000 15.38 0.538244 37.512 2.679 1 0 1428.32 31.76406
94 122 72 0 1 3 1.9 0.221774 19.000 15.86 0.574996 38.683 2.036 1 0 1509.12 45.57684
95 102 86 0 1 3 2.72 0.277069 27.200 15.46 0.57797 37.707 1.386 0.94 0.033927 1293.32 69.23975
96 131 89 0 1 3 1.4 0.145686 14.000 14.2 0.475523 34.634 2.474 1 0 1090.56 24.20611
97 133 89 0 1 3 1.34 0.160636 13.400 14.8 0.534522 36.098 2.694 1 0 1129.6 26.12554
98 109 61 1 1 3 0.08 0.048149 0.800 14.58 0.53076 35.561 44.451 1 0 1472.58 21.71602
99 117 64 1 1 3 0.12 0.061545 1.200 14.54 0.449226 35.463 29.553 1 0 1406.1 21.26874
100 117 96 1 1 3 0.1 0.042857 1.000 13.78 0.399275 33.610 33.610 1 0 934.9 13.08971
101 122 100 1 1 3 0.01 0 0.100 14.98 0.433768 36.537 365.366 1 0 927.4 15.26469
102 105 67 0 0 2 5.78 0.268465 57.800 16.94 0.612396 41.317 0.715 0.86 0.04957 1936 74.6633
103 139 69 0 0 2 3.44 0.208317 34.400 17.2 0.577821 41.951 1.220 1 0 1627.06 36.97116
104 136 83 0 0 2 3.3 0.178999 33.000 18.5 0.511301 45.122 1.367 1 0 1433.98 51.60676
105 103 94 0 0 2 4.76 0.323955 47.600 15.28 0.546633 37.268 0.783 0.96 0.027994 1232.04 64.16409
106 106 65 1 0 2 0.48 0.111538 4.800 16.6 0.5087 40.488 8.435 1 0 1428.66 22.52878
107 109 68 1 0 2 0.56 0.128285 5.600 17.2 0.50224 41.951 7.491 1 0 1385.66 23.92493
108 117 68 1 0 2 0.58 0.110988 5.800 17.2 0.499796 41.951 7.233 1 0 1377.06 24.07245
109 138 73 1 0 2 0.64 0.136307 6.400 16.22 0.511333 39.561 6.181 1 0 1309.12 28.02111




Table 19.   Refined DOE and results – Part 5. 
100 60 0 0 1 BLUE SE BLUE RED SE RED FER BLUE SE Time to SE
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111 119 93 1 0 2 0.28 0.070218 2.800 16.4 0.603392 40.000 14.286 1 0 1006.4 15.0198
112 115 95 1 0 2 0.32 0.083005 3.200 16.42 0.615507 40.049 12.515 1 0 961.28 16.85797
113 133 81 0 1 2 0.12 0.046423 1.200 16.98 0.578167 41.415 34.512 1 0 1126 16.78819
114 133 65 1 1 2 0.12 0.046423 1.200 16.76 0.492855 40.878 34.065 1 0 1386.4 18.68224
115 106 73 1 1 2 0.22 0.125487 2.200 16.38 0.52752 39.951 18.160 0.98 0.02 1257.28 40.25356
116 113 84 1 1 2 0.16 0.059659 1.600 15.58 0.540665 38.000 23.750 1 0 1048.28 16.32199
117 123 84 1 1 2 0.14 0.057214 1.400 15.82 0.498725 38.585 27.561 1 0 1067.34 15.93073
118 112 88 1 1 2 0.1 0.051508 1.000 15.92 0.529027 38.829 38.829 1 0 1053.3 17.54556
119 134 97 1 1 2 0.08 0.038756 0.800 15.8 0.667007 38.537 48.171 1 0 948.98 17.64117
120 101 70 0 0 1 5.18 0.276553 57.556 14.62 0.550243 35.659 0.620 0.76 0.061012 1868.28 103.085
121 127 63 1 0 1 1.14 0.151213 12.667 15.66 0.547059 38.195 3.015 1 0 1473.18 22.079
122 138 78 1 0 1 0.72 0.156596 8.000 15.94 0.453926 38.878 4.860 1 0 1163.32 17.60432
123 126 98 1 0 1 0.52 0.122024 5.778 15.28 0.44998 37.268 6.450 1 0 936.02 12.733
124 108 80 0 1 1 3.44 0.257397 38.222 13.74 0.492234 33.512 0.877 0.92 0.038756 1406.02 80.85161
125 100 85 0 1 1 3 0.211891 33.333 13.24 0.424322 32.293 0.969 1 0 1083.92 27.21458
126 114 85 0 1 1 3.26 0.220963 36.222 14.04 0.47891 34.244 0.945 0.94 0.033927 1229.36 68.97346
127 124 70 1 1 1 0.38 0.102579 4.222 14.9 0.361685 36.341 8.607 1 0 1275.4 18.63392
128 138 81 1 1 1 0.3 0.082065 3.333 15.56 0.453701 37.951 11.385 1 0 1111.54 15.97294
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